This work proposes a QKD-PQC hybrid for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE), establishes AKE security in the CK01 model and yields a conditional information-theoretic security guarantee when the QKD component is uncompromised; a property not achieved by prior hybrid protocols.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security for key exchange; however, its effective implementation is contingent upon the security of the classical communication channel, especially for authentication purposes. This work presents a system-level study of quantum-safe authentication for the clas...
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD) address the quantum threat from opposite directions: PQC replaces vulnerable public-key algorithms with schemes believed to resist quantum cryptanalysis, while QKD derives keys whose secrecy rests on physical assumptions rather than computational ones....
Mona Alotaibi, Noora Fetais, Saif M. Al-Kuwari· 0 citations
The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is often reduced to a primitive-replacement problem, yet the security of PQC schemes remains dependent on the integrity of the underlying host. Quantum-secure protocol frameworks like Muckle offer robust hybrid security by combining classical, post-quantum and quantum k...
Wassim Yahyaoui, Matteo Steinbach, J. Naccache et al.· Proceedings of the 2026 ACM...· 0 citations
The migration from classically secure key agreement to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is now a practical engineering problem rather than a distant theoretical one and anonymity networks face a particularly acute version of it. Traffic captured today on the Tor network can be archived and decrypted years later once a c...
Subhash Kumar, K. Kolhe· International Conference on...· 0 citations
This work reviews the HM-QCT protocol and its two-assumption model and introduces HM-PRF, a variant that replaces the short-term encryption with a pseudorandom function (PRF), evaluated locally and argues that the PRF-based assumption yields a more realistic adversary.
Jean Snyman, Ioana Boureanu, Daniel Gardham· Proceedings of the 2026 ACM...· 0 citations