An adaptive hybrid key exchange is proposed that combines the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM, FIPS 203) with elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) P-256 and selects the ML-KEM parameter set per handshake from a capability advertisement, subject to a policy-defined minimum security category.
Abstract
Consumer industrial control systems (ICS) remain in service for 10–20 years yet still establish keys with RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, so traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists (harvest-now-decrypt-later, HNDL). Their fleets mix devices with 80 KB to 4 GB of random-access memory (RAM) and must interoperate with classical-only peers, so a single static post-quantum configuration either excludes constrained devices or over-provisions capable ones, and a hybrid design is needed to retain classical security should the post-quantum primitive be weakened. We propose an adaptive hybrid key exchange that combines the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM, FIPS 203) with elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) P-256 and selects the ML-KEM parameter set per handshake from a capability advertisement, subject to a policy-defined minimum security category. Across 13,000 measured Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes on six platforms, hybrid ML-KEM-512 key establishment on an ESP32 required 51.2 ms, 47.3 KB of peak RAM, and 64.7 mJ, and the adaptive configuration, which negotiated ML-KEM-512 in the measured runs, 52.1 ms. We further examine a learned decision engine (Random Forest, XGBoost, LinUCB); in a simulation calibrated on these measurements it exceeded the better of two fixed rules by only 2.2–3.6 percentage points of oracle accuracy, and only for one security weighting. A device taxonomy and a risk-prioritised migration roadmap are also provided.
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