The biomedical significance is that, under the stated threat model, a served genomic model can process an encoded sequence without exposing plaintext queryderived activations to the compute provider.
Abstract
Human genomic sequences can identify individuals, cannot be replaced after disclosure, and are the inputs that genomic foundation models are designed to interpret. We assess whether a compute provider can execute a released genomic foundation model without receiving query-derived genomic values in plaintext and whether correctness, memory, or cost prevents complete encrypted inference. We first reproduce the released model on three genomic task families and freeze an independently validated numerical reference. We then implement a client-assisted approximate homomorphic encryption protocol: the provider evaluates linear algebra on ciphertexts, while the key-holding data owner evaluates exact normalization, causal softmax, and activation functions at fixed boundaries. A noninteractive configuration completes one released-weight block but exceeds the tested accelerator-memory envelope when configured for composition. The client-assisted configuration executes all released transformer blocks and the task head for one heldout genomic-signal input at its full prompt length. It matches the frozen final label, peaks at 9,839 mebibytes of accelerator memory, and completes in 6,683 seconds on one accelerator. These results establish arithmetic feasibility for a complete classifier, while repeatability, network transport, and private token-index lookup remain unresolved. The biomedical significance is that, under the stated threat model, a served genomic model can process an encoded sequence without exposing plaintext queryderived activations to the compute provider.
CipherGenome is presented, a protocol that keeps the embedding, attention and router of a 15.1B-parameter MoE genome model on a trusted thin client and outsources every expert projection, 95.8% of the parameters, to untrusted and possibly colluding GPU servers under module-LWE encryption.
Genome foundation models are most useful where sequences are generated, yet the largest models need datacenter accelerators and a place to send private DNA. We ask whether a 15-billion-parameter genome mixture-of-experts (MoE) model can instead run on volunteers'web browsers, with the experts spread across many untrust...
Fully homomorphic encryption allows arithmetic to be carried out on encrypted values, so that a party performing a computation need not see the data it operates on. This is useful wherever collaborating parties or sites cannot share data records or computed summaries yet need to do a joint analysis. We demonstrate the...
This paper presents a framework that automatically converts a pre-trained Keras model into a CKKS equivalent, handling parameter inference, bootstrap placement and encrypted execution without retraining, with the user only providing a configuration of the encryption parameters.
Dennis van der Werff, Georgios Tasopoulos, Francesco Regazzoni· Proceedings of the 14th Work...· 0 citations
Large Language Models (LLMs) have made it exceptionally convenient for users to send their private data to model providers, which process them in plaintext. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) promises to secure remote inference by computing directly on encrypted data, yet it has remained prohibitively slow. The effort...
Alessandro Zirilli, Davide Marincione, E. Kornaropoulos et al.· 0 citations
Genomic language models can write synthetic DNA that carries no record of its origin. A generation-time watermark could provide a provenance signal, if a verifier can detect it using only the DNA sequence, a key, and published detector settings, without knowing where the generated region starts, which strand it lies on...
K. Provatas, C. Galanopoulos, I. Georgakopoulos-Soares· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.