A write-time admission gate that, before committing a candidate fact m extracted from context c, queries the LLM K times for a soft support score and admits m only when the average exceeds a threshold, and reduces to a single forward pass in a log-probability variant for latency-sensitive deployments.
Abstract
LLM agents that operate over many turns accumulate facts in an external memory store and reuse them as premises for downstream reasoning. A hallucinated fact written at one step therefore persists as a false premise for every subsequent step, a failure mode we call memory contamination. Existing memory management addresses retrieval and capacity but not write-time correctness; this admission problem cannot be solved by utility- or recency-based criteria, and uncontrolled contamination compounds across long trajectories. We propose ConsistencyGate, a write-time admission gate that, before committing a candidate fact m extracted from context c, queries the LLM K times for a soft support score and admits m only when the average exceeds a threshold. The mechanism is model-agnostic, requires no fine-tuning, and reduces to a single forward pass in a log-probability variant for latency-sensitive deployments. To measure the effect on natural data, we construct two real-conversation benchmarks (LoCoMo-Contam and MSC-Contam) by planting controlled single-detail corruptions in long-term conversations from LoCoMo and MSC, and complement them with a structured synthetic corpus (MemContam) that isolates a near-oracle upper bound. Across four LLM backbones, ConsistencyGate reduces contamination on every benchmark relative to a write-everything baseline, with the cost concentrated on facts that are stated only implicitly in the source context. We release all three benchmarks together with the gate implementation.
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