Validating Resource-Competitive DDoS Defense Through Experiment
Abstract
A defense against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks is resource-competitive if the defense cost is small in the absence of attack and grows asymptotically more slowly than the attacker’s cost when an attack occurs. As the attacker’s cost grows, the system becomes increasingly more expensive to attack than to defend. Prior theoretical work shows that resource-competitive DDoS defenses are achievable under a simplified model. The primary contribution of this work is an empirical evaluation of whether these theoretically established resource advantages persist as the assumptions are progressively relaxed toward realistic operation. We evaluate the existing Linear and Linear-Power algorithms using controlled synthetic workloads, temporally ordered CIC-DDoS2019 traces, and a client–server implementation. Our results exhibit long-run behavior qualitatively consistent with the theoretical asymptotics, although the degree of agreement varies across attack types, and provide evidence that a resource advantage can persist under more realistic traffic. They also identify traffic structure and communication delay as important considerations in moving toward practical systems.