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Verifiable blind probabilistic error cancellation

Jul 2026 · arXiv.org · Vol abs/2607.25704 · 0 citations · 67 references
Computer Science Physics

TL;DR

VBPEC is introduced, the first secure verification protocol against a fully malicious adversary that integrates QEM and fundamentally improves the practicality of verification, establishing an essential route towards secure, reliable, and practical delegated quantum computation on near-future quantum hardware.

Abstract

Quantum error mitigation (QEM) is an essential tool for mitigating hardware noise without incurring space overhead. Yet, its reliability depends on modeling, calibration, and implementation, leaving end-to-end security on untrusted quantum hardware unresolved. We address this problem by introducing verifiable blind probabilistic error cancellation (VBPEC), the first secure verification protocol against a fully malicious adversary that integrates QEM. VBPEC brings probabilistic error cancellation (PEC), a widely studied QEM technique, within the scope of composable security by formalizing delegated mitigation as a cryptographic resource in the abstract cryptography framework. The protocol performs PEC with perfect blindness and an exponentially small security error. VBPEC retains the absence of quantum-space overhead from recent statistically-secure verified quantum computation protocols and from PEC. The only overhead takes the form of additional repetitions due to the QEM procedure. To achieve this, we extend trap-based verification from deterministic pass/fail checks to statistical tests that benefit from QEM and develop a new proof technique that integrates the corresponding additional deviation sources. Rather than merely tolerating honest noise below a fixed threshold, VBPEC actively cancels it, enabling correctly mitigated estimates to be accepted with high probability without compromising security. Our framework thus establishes an essential route towards secure, reliable, and practical delegated quantum computation on near-future quantum hardware: VBPEC fundamentally improves the practicality of verification.

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