VBPEC is introduced, the first secure verification protocol against a fully malicious adversary that integrates QEM and fundamentally improves the practicality of verification, establishing an essential route towards secure, reliable, and practical delegated quantum computation on near-future quantum hardware.
Abstract
Quantum error mitigation (QEM) is an essential tool for mitigating hardware noise without incurring space overhead. Yet, its reliability depends on modeling, calibration, and implementation, leaving end-to-end security on untrusted quantum hardware unresolved. We address this problem by introducing verifiable blind probabilistic error cancellation (VBPEC), the first secure verification protocol against a fully malicious adversary that integrates QEM. VBPEC brings probabilistic error cancellation (PEC), a widely studied QEM technique, within the scope of composable security by formalizing delegated mitigation as a cryptographic resource in the abstract cryptography framework. The protocol performs PEC with perfect blindness and an exponentially small security error. VBPEC retains the absence of quantum-space overhead from recent statistically-secure verified quantum computation protocols and from PEC. The only overhead takes the form of additional repetitions due to the QEM procedure. To achieve this, we extend trap-based verification from deterministic pass/fail checks to statistical tests that benefit from QEM and develop a new proof technique that integrates the corresponding additional deviation sources. Rather than merely tolerating honest noise below a fixed threshold, VBPEC actively cancels it, enabling correctly mitigated estimates to be accepted with high probability without compromising security. Our framework thus establishes an essential route towards secure, reliable, and practical delegated quantum computation on near-future quantum hardware: VBPEC fundamentally improves the practicality of verification.
This paper proposes a dynamic quantum secure multi-party multiplication protocol with verifiable result integrity, based on homomorphic encryption, that can resist a series of typical external and internal attacks.
Fu-Lin Li, Rong-Pei Li, Yi-Xin Sun et al.· Quantum Information Processi...· 0 citations
A new lower bound is given on any attack on this scheme, in particular proving nearly-linear quantum gate lower bounds on the attacker, even when allowing the attacker to declare a transmission loss of up to $50\%$, allowing for the challenges prepared by the referee to be imperfect, and allowing the quantum messages u...
A circuit-model blind quantum computation protocol that conceals the target quantum computation while decoupling the encryption and decryption keys, and proves the verifiability of the protocol, where verification is achieved by estimating expectation values of randomly chosen Pauli observables, thereby substantially r...
This work introduces and experimentally demonstrate a loss-tolerant QPV (LT-QPV) protocol whose security is independent of channel loss, and proves finite-size security against quantum polynomial-time entangled adversaries in the quantum random oracle model instantiated with cryptographically secure hash functions.
Wen Yu Kon, N. Bigagli, Andrew Conrad et al.· 1 citation
By endowing the minimal-detector receiver of polarization QKD with a conclusive, loss-robust disturbance alarm, the solution lowers the hardware entry cost of security-monitored QKD, hence fostering its adoption at the cost-sensitive network edge.
In Incorrect-Plaintext Attacks (IPA), a malicious Data Owner (DO) compromises system security by encrypting incorrect plaintext, while a malicious Data User (DU) undermines system fairness by falsely claiming decryption failure even when the plaintext is valid. Both security and fairness vulnerabilities can be further...
Zhan Xie, Liang-Min Wang, Hai-Qin Wu et al.· IEEE Transactions on Informa...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.