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A Kinematic Measurement Method for GNSS Spoofing Monitoring and Source Localization

2026 · IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement · Vol 75, pp. 8514616-8514616 · 0 citations · 59 references

Abstract

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) support critical positioning, navigation, and timing services. It is well known that spoofing signals can corrupt pseudorange and clock-bias observables. This article aims to present a single-receiver kinematic method for spoofing monitoring and satellite-wise identification of spoofed measurements, with source localization when a reliable receiver trajectory is available. When all tracked signals are spoofed, localization requires a receiver trajectory from an independent, trusted source. The method exploits motion-induced propagation-range changes between a moving receiver and an approximately stationary spoofer. This variation is embedded in counterfeit pseudorange and receiver clock-bias measurements. After geometry screening, an epoch-differenced nongeometric pseudorange residual (NGPR) is constructed for each satellite and used to form a residual-energy statistic. A first-order Gauss–Markov model captures NGPR correlation. Satellite-specific variance and correlation estimates from a disjoint presumed-authentic segment yield $F$ -distribution thresholds with effective degrees of freedom adjusted for temporal correlation and finite reference data. The identified spoofed measurements are then used for two-stage localization. It is based on the reconstructed counterfeit clock-bias sequence. Monte Carlo simulations, the TEXBAT dataset, and a controlled field campaign validate the method. Finally, the results show reliable monitoring under sufficient kinematic excitation, over 99 % detection probability in representative simulations, and a field horizontal localization error of 8.4 m after nonlinear refinement.

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