A Kinematic Measurement Method for GNSS Spoofing Monitoring and Source Localization
Abstract
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) support critical positioning, navigation, and timing services. It is well known that spoofing signals can corrupt pseudorange and clock-bias observables. This article aims to present a single-receiver kinematic method for spoofing monitoring and satellite-wise identification of spoofed measurements, with source localization when a reliable receiver trajectory is available. When all tracked signals are spoofed, localization requires a receiver trajectory from an independent, trusted source. The method exploits motion-induced propagation-range changes between a moving receiver and an approximately stationary spoofer. This variation is embedded in counterfeit pseudorange and receiver clock-bias measurements. After geometry screening, an epoch-differenced nongeometric pseudorange residual (NGPR) is constructed for each satellite and used to form a residual-energy statistic. A first-order Gauss–Markov model captures NGPR correlation. Satellite-specific variance and correlation estimates from a disjoint presumed-authentic segment yield $F$ -distribution thresholds with effective degrees of freedom adjusted for temporal correlation and finite reference data. The identified spoofed measurements are then used for two-stage localization. It is based on the reconstructed counterfeit clock-bias sequence. Monte Carlo simulations, the TEXBAT dataset, and a controlled field campaign validate the method. Finally, the results show reliable monitoring under sufficient kinematic excitation, over 99 % detection probability in representative simulations, and a field horizontal localization error of 8.4 m after nonlinear refinement.