Performance Evaluation of the Layer 2.5 Zero-Trust Adaptation Layer (ZTAL) Architecture in Tactical UAV Mesh Networks Against Spectrum Attacks
Abstract
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mesh networks must maintain useful communication under rapid topology changes, spectrum attack, and traffic pressure. This paper evaluates a Layer-2.5 Zero-Trust Adaptation Layer (ZTAL) as an in-path logical shim between IPv4/OLSR and IEEE 802.11p MAC/PHY. The final experiment uses 90 ns-3 simulations from final_matrix_v3 with Gauss-Markov mobility, 10 and 20 UAV, EDCA, REACTIVE_FH, and ZTAL treatments, and NONE, CW_JAMMING, and ALG_DOS conditions. At 10 UAV under the configured 50 dBm CW jammer, ZTAL improved packet delivery ratio from 57.71% with EDCA to 69.96% (paired difference +12.25 percentage points, Holm p=1.14e-5). At 20 UAV, ZTAL improved PDR from 26.83% to 45.95% (paired difference +19.13 percentage points, Holm p=6.04e-7). Relative to REACTIVE_FH, ZTAL showed higher mean PDR and more reliable coordination, but the PDR advantage was not statistically conclusive after multiplicity correction with n=5. The results also show no-attack overhead, lower delivered byte throughput in several cases, and substantial queue expiry under high-density/load stress. A separate Hard Purge microbenchmark reduced peak protocol-managed reassembly payload state from 192,000 B to 96,020 B under the tested authenticated overlap pattern. The findings support bounded simulation evidence for CW resilience and state-release behavior, not field deployment readiness.