ParEvalLayer, a decision layer that reads paired outcomes for two agent systems and a comparison policy chosen in advance, is introduced, a decision layer that reads paired outcomes for two agent systems and a comparison policy chosen in advance.
Abstract
LLM-agent evaluations often produce task outcomes long before the full benchmark run is complete. A partial score is tempting to report, but it does not show whether the observed tasks support the same conclusion as the completed evaluation. Early tasks can omit important parts of a benchmark, running cheaper tasks first can distort the observed sample, and a rule that decides only easy pairs can appear accurate while leaving many comparisons unresolved. We introduce ParEvalLayer, a decision layer that reads paired outcomes for two agent systems and a comparison policy chosen in advance. For each partial run, it records whether the tested agent system is better by the required amount, is not better by that amount, needs more evidence, or should abstain. We evaluate ParEvalLayer by replaying completed public benchmark data as if each evaluation had stopped earlier. At each point, ParEvalLayer applies the policy using only the outcomes observed so far; if it reaches one of the two comparison judgments, we check whether that judgment matches the completed data for the same system pair. With the main comparison rule, three of the public benchmarks reach the same decision as the completed evaluation after observing only 15% to 25% of task outcomes. Other benchmarks require more task outcomes. This variation shows why a partial score alone is not enough: reports should also state the decision rule and how many comparisons remain without a decision.
An LLM-agent leaderboard invites a familiar inference: an agent ranked above another is the better agent. Public evaluation logs may not support that conclusion when systems differ in task mixture, label source, release detail, or cost rule. We study what leaderboard scores estimate and when they justify pairwise superiority conclusions. Our estimand-aware pairwise procedure states the comparison target and measurement source, checks common support, and evaluates the supported difference using a stated uncertainty rule and practical margin. Controlled checks evaluate the decision labels under known finite-sample conditions and show why uncertainty must be included when judging sensitivity to target reweighting. Across SWE-bench, AgentRewardBench, and tau2-bench, close rank differences are often unresolved; proxy labels and utility rules can also change which system is selected. DataAgentBench and Open Agent show what remains estimable from coarser public records. A leaderboard score summarizes a released evaluation, whereas a fine-grained superiority claim additionally depends on the estimand and uncertainty rule used to interpret the difference.
A completion argument that identifies the evidence needed for each decision is developed and an open-effects record for operations and resources that may remain relevant after the endpoint, their status, and their possible effects on the scored outcome or another run is proposed.
EcoAgent-Bench is introduced, in which every task specifies priced actions and an explicit budget, and results show that completion under a budget and economical action selection are distinct properties.
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This work conceptualizes multi-agent reasoning as an evolutionary pipeline of candidate generation, peer communication and terminal selection, wherein consensus without quality control can exhibit patterns of memetic drift.
Jia-Hao Ji, Si-Jie Li, Jia-Bei Cheng et al.· 0 citations
Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time. Since the number of games needed is unknown, fixed-budget evaluations either keep paying after the result is settled or stop before the agents can be told apart, while naive optional stopping with an ordinary confidence interval invalidates the stated level. We make such an evaluation stop as soon as its evidence suffices, with the guarantee intact. The Action-Informed Value Assessment Tool (AIVAT) reduces variance in imperfect-information games through conditional mean-zero corrections, by a median $54\times$ across 15 LLM agent configurations spanning 71,439 paired Heads-Up No-Limit Hold'em (HUNL) hands, but does not say when to stop. We combine AIVAT with continuously monitored Confidence Sequences (CSs) into anytime-valid AIVAT (AV-AIVAT), whose online value model learns only from past games so that no game scores its own correction. At the nominal 95\% level and a target precision of $\pm1$ Big Blind, raw outcomes need a median $74\times$ as many hands as AIVAT-corrected outcomes to stop under the Asymptotic CS (AsympCS). Exact finite-sample certification uses the Empirical-Bernstein CS (EB-CS), which needs an independently justified bound on corrected payoffs. We establish such a bound structurally for Leduc hold'em and characterize a width floor set by the CS's bet cap and that bound, which governs how much of a variance gain becomes earlier stopping; the descriptive HUNL EB-CS runs show a median $1.37\times$ stopping-time ratio. AV-AIVAT turns variance reduction into efficient, auditable early stopping while separating asymptotic screening from exact certification, so an evaluation can stop the moment its evidence suffices and hand a third party everything needed to recheck the verdict at that very stopping time.
The collaboration tax is formulated as the team-decentralisation loss of a two-player cooperative game with private information, with two propositions characterising its sign and its equivalence to a max-superadditivity violation.
Wei-Xiang Sun, Zehong Wang, Hong Huang et al.· 0 citations
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