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Preprint

Finite-Key Readiness and Authentication-Key Replenishment in QKD-Assisted UAV Edge Computing

Nov 2026 · 0 citations · 31 references
Physics

Abstract

A service that needs fresh quantum keys must wait for key release, and may be denied it, before protected computation starts. We quantify this cost for a trusted stationary UAV serving two ground gateways, each obtaining its keys from one finite-key decoy-state BB84 attempt with parameters fixed in advance. A count-level Monte Carlo model, reproduced by a semi-analytic model, links key acceptance to protected upload, computation, and download, including failed attempts and hover energy. At 26~dB effective optical loss, with authentication hashing at its proxy-benchmarked, near-zero cost, fresh keys raise the 95th-percentile completion time of both tasks from 10.37 to 28.65~s; hover energy grows in proportion. The scalar rate models evaluated here miss the deadline limit on the block size. The pulse budget lies in a window bounded below by authentication-key replenishment and above by the deadline; for a fixed source, channel, and acceptance model, the authentication debit shifts the floor, whereas hashing cost does not. At a 35-s deadline the largest tested loss with a non-empty window is 27~dB at 1\% misalignment and 22~dB at 2\%; at 3\% no tested setting has one. Conditional on the assumed acquisition probability, the selected configurations meet this deadline with simultaneous lower confidence bounds of 96.9--97.3\% on held-out trials, at 26~dB and at 18--20~dB with 2\% misalignment. A high-cost stress reference that charges hashing in full narrows the window and lowers these loss limits to 26 and 20~dB at the reference processing capacity. A small rise in error rate or loss pushes the deadline probability well below its target and drains authentication keys, while the protocol's security parameter is unchanged.

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