Aug 2026· Manufacturing & Service Operations Management· 0 citations
TL;DR
It is shown that the two-sided system decouples and disclosure decisions can be analyzed as two one-sided systems only if some level of information (binary or occupancy) is disclosed to both user classes.
Abstract
Problem Definition: We study delay information disclosure policies for on-demand platforms serving two user classes (customers and providers) who seek matches using the platform. The platform's objective is to maximize the match rate by choosing the level of information—no information, binary information (indicating whether the wait is zero or non-zero), or occupancy information (indicating the expected delay based on the number of users currently in the system)—to disclose to each user class. Users of each class are strategic and decide whether to join or balk based on the delay information disclosed to them. Methodology/results: We consider two user types in each user class: patient users who are willing to wait for a match and impatient users who are not. We use continuous-time Markov chains to model the system as two-sided queues and employ equilibrium analysis to characterize users' joining behavior and the platform's match rate under each information disclosure policy. We show that the two-sided system decouples and disclosure decisions can be analyzed as two one-sided systems only if some level of information (binary or occupancy) is disclosed to both user classes. We find that disclosing binary information dominates disclosing no information or occupancy information to a user class when its patient users are sufficiently patient, while disclosing occupancy information dominates disclosing binary information to a user class when there are enough patient users. Numerical experiments show that disclosing occupancy information to both user classes, while often suboptimal, is typically not suboptimal by much. Finally, we find that compared to the platform's optimal disclosure choice, a user class may prefer more or less granular information for themselves or the other class. Furthermore, this utility analysis does not lend itself to decoupling. Managerial implications: Our findings hold crucial implications for platform managers: carefully evaluating the chosen information-sharing strategy is imperative, and guidelines from the one-sided literature are generally inadequate for making disclosure decisions
Membership plans, which are ubiquitous in many industries, have recently emerged on platforms operating under the sharing economy model. Unlike traditional firms with stable, captive supply and fixed marginal costs, sharing economy platforms rely on independent service providers who self-schedule their participation. T...
Hao-Zhao Zhang, Huseyin Cavusoglu, S. Raghunathan· Information systems research· 0 citations
This work develops a Stackelberg game in which the platform chooses the display policy, and sellers subsequently set prices in response to the competitors they face within their assigned partition, and develops an algorithm that effectively solves seller partitions, traffic allocation, and equilibrium prices.
Hongyu Chen, Hanwei Li, D. Simchi-Levi et al.· Production and operations ma...· 1 citation
Problem definition: In the platform economy, platforms often engage in both demand and supply competition. We consider two platforms competing through service prices and wages. Instead of exploring myopic stability, i.e., Nash equilibrium, which focuses on the immediate payoff change from a one-step deviation, the two...
Hongqiao Chen, Pengfei Guo, Qing-Ying Li et al.· Manufacturing & Service...· 0 citations
Purely online channels are limited in conveying non-digital product attributes, such as fit, material, and usage experience, which creates product-fit uncertainty and utility loss for consumers. Physical showrooms can reduce such uncertainty, but consumers must incur hassle costs from travel, time, and store visits. Th...
Shi-Tong Li, Zhen-Xing Xu, Wen-Yu Chen et al.· 2026 12th International Conf...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.