Aug 2026· Engineering Construction and Architectural Management· pp. 1-32· 0 citations· 57 references
Abstract
This study investigates collaborative technological innovation models between the owner and the supplier in megaprojects. It aims to optimize heterogeneous resource inputs, namely capital and knowledge and balance expected returns against systemic risks during dynamic technology accumulation under stochastic disturbances to advance core technology development.
This study develops a continuous-time stochastic differential game framework. By solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations and endogenizing the supplier's unobservable effort, this study compares three innovation models: the independent innovation model, the capital sharing model and the collaborative research and development (R&D) model.
The marginal revenue ratio acts as the primary driver of cooperation. Analysis reveals a “proportional rigidity” phenomenon where optimal investment allocation proportions remain unaffected by external stochastic shocks, determined solely by the internal benefit structure. Moreover, high supplier absorptive capacity and knowledge spillover risks induce a “defensive substitution mechanism,” which leads the owner to reduce capital sharing and increase direct technical intervention. Although collaborative R&D increases systemic variance, it achieves Pareto optimality and maximizes technology output.
By integrating capital and knowledge within a dynamic framework of risk and return trade-offs, this study extends the existing literature on single-resource inputs. Furthermore, the research provides structural explanations for moral hazard and collaborative breakdown, thereby offering governance strategies and performance-based incentive mechanisms for complex engineering consortia. Methodologically, by embedding knowledge spillovers, absorptive capacity and endogenous effort into a stochastic differential game, this study defines the robustness boundaries and risk-return trade-offs across different collaborative models.
This article develops a theoretical model to analyze the interaction between competitions andcooperation in public competitions for the allocation of research and development (R&D) resources, withan emphasis on universities with asymmetric capabilities. Using a Tullock-type framework, a strategicgame is modeled in whic...
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Digital capability has become a key driver of transformation in the construction industry, emerging from stakeholders' collective digital investments. This study aims to develop an incentive mechanism that motivates project participants to undertake digital investment efforts in construction projects.
Buildi...
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This study aims to examine how network externality affects coordination in a fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) supply chain in which a supplier undertakes product innovation and a retail platform controls advertising and access. It evaluates stationary outcomes under unilateral and bilateral cost sharing within a c...