Authentication in global quantum key distribution networks
Abstract
The gap between ideal cryptographic primitives and their practical real-world implementations gives rise to vulnerabilities. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic protocol which by use of a quantum communication channel achieves Information Theoretic Security (ITS), eliminating assumptions on the bounds on the adversary’s computational capabilities. In the ideal version, QKD assumes the existence of an authenticated classical communication channel which, in the real world, has to be implemented with cryptographic authentication mechanisms and supporting infrastructure. Specifically, whenever two users want to establish a QKD connection between them for the first time, then they need to be securely identified and authenticated to each other. As a result, secure and scalable authentication bootstrapping in real-world, dynamically changing QKD networks remains a challenge. This paper presents a security analysis of Public Key Infrastructure and other approaches for practical authentication bootstrapping in terrestrial and non-terrestrial QKD networks. The analysis is structured by considering various possible worlds in average-case complexity as formulated by Impagliazzo.