Skip to content
Book Open access

Attest the Whole, Verify Incrementally: Whole-Program Integrity via Lazy Verification in Trusted Execution Environments

Nov 2026 · Proceedings of the 2026 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 0 citations · 54 references

Abstract

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) traditionally employ a ''measure-then-launch'' model, attesting all code and data before execution begins. While this provides strong integrity guarantees, it imposes a startup latency proportional to the total program size, which is a significant bottleneck for large-scale applications like Large Language Models (LLMs) or databases that may only access a fraction of their footprint. We propose a lazy-verification architecture that decouples holistic attestation from per-block verification. At launch, the design performs an attestation of compact metadata representing the entire program state. Integrity is enforced through incremental verification of requested code and data blocks during runtime loading, before their first architecturally visible use. We formally model enclave execution under lazy verification and prove that our design preserves the same security properties and accepted execution traces as conventional whole-program attestation. We implement our design on both Intel SGX and AMD SEV-SNP. Evaluation across network services, database workloads, and LLM inference shows that our approach significantly reduces startup overhead and improves end-to-end performance, particularly for data-intensive applications with sparse access patterns.

Read PDF

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.