African Normative Personhood and the (Im)Permissibility of Euthanasia.
Abstract
Accounts of normative ethics that are based on the African conception of personhood tend to say that the goal of morality is to develop one's normative personhood (i.e., character), which is accomplished by exercising other-regarding virtues in the context of community. One argument in the African philosophical tradition that defends the permissibility of euthanasia appeals to this understanding of personhood. This argument suggests that developing a sufficient degree of personhood leads to a kind of achievement dignity that can be lost in the process of a bad death. As such, euthanasia is permissible in order to preserve achievement dignity. I argue that there are a number of problems with this argument, including that it cannot apply to those who fail to develop their personhood, that it is impossible to lose achievement dignity for non-moral reasons, and that the argument may prove too much in justifying involuntary euthanasia. An argument for the permissibility of euthanasia that appeals to the achievement dignity associated with African personhood cannot be successful. Furthermore, shifting the argument to an appeal to status dignity, which is grounded in personhood, is unlikely to completely rescue it.