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Patriarchal Bargains as Oppressive Double Binds

Aug 2026 · Hypatia · pp. 1-18 · 0 citations · 11 references

Abstract

In this paper, I define patriarchal bargains as a subset of oppressive double binds. They are situations in which an agent, under conditions of gender oppression, intentionally chooses the prudentially best option—complying with an oppressive norm—over the morally best option—resisting the norm—even though both options are “inextricably bound up” (Hirji 2021, 645). I then explore two frameworks to examine the bargainer’s responsibility for choosing the prudentially best option: forward-looking political responsibility (Young 2011) and backward-looking moral responsibility (Sangiovanni 2018). Forward-looking political responsibility shows some conceptual limitations in justifying why the bargainer is neither blameworthy nor liable for choosing the prudentially best option when she is aware of the implications of her choice and does not face unreasonable costs in forgoing the bargain. However, backward-looking moral responsibility faces two practical concerns: first, it risks diverting attention from the oppressive structures that constrain the bargainer’s moral agency; and second, it may be divisive and isolating by promoting negative emotions such as guilt and shame, which could discourage people from participating in collective struggles for social change.

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