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What Is It Like to Be a Machine? Bats, Intelligent Design, and the Problem of Other Minds

2026 · Revista de Filosofia Aurora · 0 citations · 13 references

Abstract

Abstract Starting from Thomas Nagel’s classic essay What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, this article investigates the philosophical problem of consciousness and its implications for Artificial Intelligence. It argues that an objective description of physical and computational processes is insufficient to explain the subjective character of experience, that is, the fact that there is something it is like to be a particular organism. Drawing on Nagel’s analysis of bats, the article discusses the persistence of the so-called explanatory gap between the physical correlates of consciousness and phenomenal experience. The discussion is then extended to the domain of intelligent machines, asking what it would mean to be a machine and whether artificial systems could possess their own forms of experience or understanding of the world. The article critically examines the contemporary imaginary surrounding Artificial General Intelligence, highlighting the limitations of approaches that reduce intelligence to information processing and algorithmic optimization, while arguing that intelligence also involves pragmatic engagement, meaning-making, and structural coupling with the environment. Finally, it draws on autopoietic enactivism to defend the view that different forms of life and cognition generate different worlds of meaning, suggesting that the real challenge is not whether machines can think like us, but whether they might come to inhabit a world of meanings of their own.

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