Formal Verification of Privacy Properties in Post-Quantum EDHOC for UAV Communications
Abstract
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical applications, where communication often involves sensitive operational data and identifying information. Cryptographic protocols such as Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) help protect these interactions by enabling two parties to establish a shared session key while mutually authenticating each other's identity. However, a central privacy concern is whether protocol exchanges and subsequent protected payloads reveal information that allows adversaries to distinguish commands, identify the parties, or link sessions. This paper presents a symbolic privacy analysis of a five-message post-quantum variant of the Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a lightweight protocol for authenticated key establishment. We model the protocol in the Tamarin Prover and construct observational equivalence experiments for session key indistinguishability, command payload indistinguishability, and credential identifier anonymity and unlinkability. Our results provide machine-checked proofs that these privacy properties hold under the specified adversarial assumptions, while also clarifying which privacy threats they help to mitigate in UAV systems.