Jun 2026· arXiv.org· Vol abs/2606.28958· 2 citations· 41 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
The main lesson is that full-KV latent memory can be useful, but it should be treated as a security-sensitive object, not as ordinary internal model state.
Abstract
LLM agents can share more than text. In some systems, an agent can send a short visible message while also passing its full KV-cache state to another model. This hidden state can help the final model combine evidence from several agents, but it is also hard to inspect. A visible message may look harmless even if the hidden state has been changed. We study this problem in a multi-agent question-answering setup. Specialists each see part of the evidence, send a short commitment, and pass full KV-cache state to a coordinator. In clean runs, this latent collaboration improves over a matched text-only version. On transformed HiddenBench with Qwen3-4B, it reaches EM/F1 of 0.338/0.486, compared with 0.231/0.369 for text collaboration. Qwen3-8B and HotPotQA runs show the same direction of improvement. The problem appears when one specialist is malicious. Some false visible commitments can steer answers. More seriously, changing the hidden KV state can collapse performance even when the visible commitment still looks plausible. A verifier that checks only text misses this failure mode. Simple magnitude checks catch some obvious corruptions, but adaptive attacks can evade them while still damaging the final answer. The most reliable fix we find is not to guess whether hidden state looks normal, but to protect it in transport. We implement an HMAC-SHA256 manifest that binds the specialist, session, model, visible commitment, tensor metadata, and payload digest. It accepts all 774 honest replayed payloads and rejects all 295 recorded tampered payloads. The main lesson is that full-KV latent memory can be useful, but it should be treated as a security-sensitive object, not as ordinary internal model state.
Multi-agent LLM systems relay key-value caches instead of text and credit their gains to exchanged"latent thoughts". That credit is a claim about which example's cache is relayed, not merely that one is. We audit it causally in released systems. The cache is replaced with deranged (mismatched-example), zeroed, and moment-matched random counterparts, under two regimes defined by whether the receiver needs the sender's private information. Where it does, the battery reads ceiling: 100% against 23-25% for answer-irrelevant relays on the primary backbone, a contrast replicated across three families, five checkpoints, and a prose document-QA surface. Where it does not, a pre-registered five-seed protocol establishes equivalence within 2.8 points, a margin anchored to the audited system's reported gain, under Holm-corrected TOST on GSM8K and ARC-Challenge across three Qwen3 scales and on MedQA at 8B (one cell shows a small detected advantage inside the margin); a second family shows no detected advantage. A large cache effect need not be a pairing effect. In one natural cell, zeroing the relay costs 14.7 points; a mismatched cache, 0.4. Nor is need sufficient: under the same test, delivered channels span ceiling (LatentMAS's native relay), partial (KVComm's layer subset), and no detected example-specific transfer (C2C's released projector). Benchmark deltas do not by themselves establish latent-thought transmission; establishing it takes a mismatched-cache audit, which we release.
Multi-agent LLM applications chain a planner, worker agents, a verifier, and a synthesizer, and every hop between agents is an unmonitored channel through which an adversary can smuggle instructions. Existing defenses guard only the input boundary (IBProtector, Llama Guard, perplexity filters, SmoothLLM) or run outside the application as opaque, stochastic provider-side filters. We show this gap carries a consequence rarely measured: on a 2,100-trace evaluation across eight attack families, five defenses, and three model backends, an undefended pipeline that appears fully safe under standard reporting (attack success 0.000 on tool- and memory-poisoning) owes that safety almost entirely to the cloud provider's server-side filter (54 of 60 blocks on Azure GPT-5), and silently shifts to the agent model's own alignment on a backend without such a filter. Outcome-only reporting hides this dependence. We present ChannelGuard, a training-free defense-in-depth framework placing information-bottleneck gates on every inter-agent channel; each scores channel text against an adversarial phrase bank by embedding similarity and deterministically passes, compresses, or blocks it, adding no LLM call, while an attribution method records which layer stopped each attack. ChannelGuard's tool-output gate blocks Tool Poisoning 30 of 30 at the application layer, identically across Azure GPT-5, Anthropic Sonnet 4.5, and Anthropic Haiku 4.5, whereas the undefended pipeline shifts entirely across backends; it also lowers Prompt Injection attack success by half (0.333 to 0.167) and preserves GSM8K accuracy exactly (0.867). White-box adaptive paraphrase evades every embedding gate, where a perturb-and-vote baseline does better. An extended appendix adds baselines, ablations, sweeps, a benign-preservation analysis, and a judge audit (kappa = 0.900), at a total cost of 47.36 USD.
Elias Hossain, Md. Mehedi Hasan Bhuiyan Nipu, Fatema Tuj Johora Faria et al.· 0 citations
Memory is central to long-horizon LLM agents, yet existing memory systems primarily preserve interaction content rather than modeling which agents can be trusted and under what conditions. This limitation is particularly important in multi-agent systems, where a central model may be unable to directly verify plausible or correlated peer responses. We introduce $\Sigma$-Mem, an online reliability memory that records historical competence evidence for individual peers and peer relationship evidence across the peer set. Both forms of evidence are maintained as real symmetric states and updated from post-decision correctness feedback. By Weyl's inequality, the spectral change caused by each event-level update is bounded, enabling stable online adaptation without retraining the underlying models. $\Sigma$-Mem provides a general write-and-read interface: the same memory can be used for residual steering of a central model, response-free peer routing, or reliability-weighted voting. Across five Qwen-family models, $\Sigma$-Mem adapts to counterfactual reliability shifts and generalizes to unseen peers and task domains. Direct memory readouts also outperform majority voting and the best fixed peer over the full OOD evaluation set. Moreover, performance improves consistently as more correctness feedback becomes available, indicating that $\Sigma$-Mem progressively accumulates actionable reliability information. These results establish reliability memory as a reusable foundation for adaptive coordination in LLM-based multi-agent systems.
This work introduces a collective evidence-threshold backdoor paradigm for MAS and Boundary-Conditioned Backdoor Injection, which constructs counterfactual boundary pairs to separate benign behavior before the threshold from the adversarial objective after it, and learns latent progression aligned with evidence.
Jiahao Xiao, Lei Feng, Min-Ling Zhang· 0 citations
Multi-agent systems built from large language models are deployed widely, yet how much performance is lost when two LLMs must coordinate rather than act alone remains unclear. We formulate the collaboration tax as the team-decentralisation loss of a two-player cooperative game with private information, with two propositions characterising its sign and its equivalence to a max-superadditivity violation. We operationalise this definition on 32 solo-tractable tasks grouped by source of grounding friction and measure it on 11 models from 7 providers. The tax is structured along two no-exception axes: a category ordering across every model and a monotonic decrease with capability. The proximate mechanism is not a reasoning deficit but a four-stage conversational cascade in which agents make ungrounded claims, fail to query the partner, skip integrating both views, and accept the answer without re-derivation. The tax is mechanically predictable from conversation features and partly tractable: a prompt intervention targeting all four stages closes a substantial fraction of the gap, with the dominant bottleneck differing across categories. In heterogeneous pairs the tax is pulled toward the stronger partner rather than the additive midpoint, empirically realising the max-superadditivity violation predicted by our framework. Together these results recast collaboration in LLM systems as a measurable, predictable, and partly tractable cost.
Weixiang Sun, Zehong Wang, Hong Huang et al.· 0 citations
This study cautions against transplanting verification into grounding pipelines and identifies calibrated abstention as a property worth preserving and proposes an abstention-aware verifier that intervenes only under sufficient candidate coverage and confidence.
Duchen Li· Poster Volume 0008 The 2026...· 0 citations