TRIS: A Tri-Layer Retrieval Integrity Sieve Against Knowledge Poisoning
TL;DR
The Tri-Layer Sieve is presented, a middleware defense that sanitizes retrieved evidence through cross-embedding-space clustering with an independent judge model, structural filtering of trigger-payload artifacts, and LLM consistency verification, and exploits a key weakness of retrieval-stage poisoning.
Abstract
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) grounds large language models in external corpora, but implicit trust in retrieved documents creates a critical attack surface: PoisonedRAG shows that a handful of crafted passages can dominate dense retrieval and steer generation toward attacker-chosen answers. We present the Tri-Layer Sieve, a middleware defense that sanitizes retrieved evidence through cross-embedding-space clustering with an independent judge model, structural filtering of trigger-payload artifacts, and LLM consistency verification. The design exploits a key weakness of retrieval-stage poisoning: a single document must satisfy one embedding geometry, one internal Trigger-Payload structure, and one generation objective - rarely all three simultaneously, a fragility that persists even against an adaptive attacker who paraphrases around it. On Natural Questions, HotpotQA, and MS-MARCO with Contriever retrieval (k=50), the Sieve reduces black-box Attack Success Rate from 67.0/87.0/64.0% to 3.0/14.0/4.0%, mitigates white-box HotFlip attacks from ~74% to 27.8% on NQ with Layer 3 enabled, and drives poisoned-document MRR to 0.000, while restoring clean accuracy from 13-33% under attack to 58-76%. Under an architecture-aware adversary who paraphrases triggers to evade the structural filter, enabling the consistency layer halves adaptive ASR (32.0% to 15.0% on NQ) while raising clean accuracy by 18 points, at an added latency of ~16-19 s/query under live retrieval.
