Lending Relationships Along Ownership Lines: Institutional Cross‐Ownership and Bank Loan Contracts

Abstract

We find that banking relationships built through institutional cross‐ownership influence the granting of loans as well as loan contract terms. Firms that are newly added to institutional cross‐owners' portfolios are more likely to borrow from banks that previously issued loans to other firms within the same portfolio. These related banks charge lower loan interest spreads and offer greater loan amounts than other banks issuing loans to the same borrower. However, such loans also are more likely to include capital covenants in the presence of high shareholder–debtholder conflicts. Thus, lenders appear to value the benefits of common institutional ownership while still protecting themselves against potential risk shifting. The interest spread effect is stronger for borrowers with high information asymmetry, low accounting quality, more financial distress risk, and dedicated institutional common owners. These results are consistent with either direct information flows or indirect signaling effects and are robust to different fixed effects specifications as well as to an identification strategy that exploits common ownership stemming from financial institution mergers. Overall, our study provides evidence that investor networks play a beneficial role in the production and dissemination of contracting‐relevant information and highlights cross‐ownership as a favorable determinant for contracting efficiency beyond traditional accounting measures.