SafeCommit, a risk controlled layer between agent reasoning and external execution, is introduced, a calibrated set of plausible latent worlds from memory, observations, tool outputs, provenance, and policy constraints that permits a side effectful action only when a conformal action certificate shows that the action is safe in every retained world.
Abstract
Long-horizon agents increasingly use persistent memory and tools to take actions with external side effects. A central failure mode is premature commitment: an agent acts before resolving whether its memory grounding is stale, conflicting, incomplete, or corrupted. We formalize this problem as safe commitment under memory uncertainty and introduce SafeCommit, a risk controlled layer between agent reasoning and external execution. The layer constructs a calibrated set of plausible latent worlds from memory, observations, tool outputs, provenance, and policy constraints. It permits a side effectful action only when a conformal action certificate shows that the action is safe in every retained world. Otherwise, it selects a low-side-effect probe that targets the worlds blocking certification, or returns a conservative fallback. Under calibrated world coverage, the probability of an unsafe certified commit is at most the target level {\alpha}; with imperfect world proposal, the bound separates calibration and representation error. A dependency-free controlled simulator illustrates the safety-utility tradeoff and reproduces all reported results with one command. The goal is to offer a concrete approach for deciding not only what an agent should do, but when the available evidence is sufficient to safely do it.
This work argues that a memory write is not a belief commit, and presents MemTX, a transactional belief-commit protocol, a transactional belief-commit protocol that leads all eight baselines with paired-McNemar significance on four backbones and statistically ties the best baseline on the fifth and strongest, while remaining the only method with zero downstream harm on every backbone.
Xiaoyang Li, Yi-Qi Wang, Haohui Lu et al.· arXiv.org· 5 citations· ⚡1
As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services. Recent runtime guardrails mitigate such risks by checking proposed actions before execution, but many remain reactive: they primarily assess the apparent safety of the current action, lacking an explicit model of how risk evolves across the trajectory. This limitation creates a critical blind spot for long-horizon risks, where individually benign-looking actions can gradually drift the agent toward hazardous states. In response, we propose DreamGuard, a proactive guardrail for LLM agents built around a risk-aware world model. The world model maintains a compact recurrent latent state over the trajectory and predicts future latent states from which DreamGuard derives immediate-hazard and prefix-risk evidence. It then fuses these multi-horizon signals into intervention decisions before execution. Experiments across four benchmarks and an online guardrail evaluation show that DreamGuard outperforms generic, reactive, and proactive guardrail baselines, achieves the best safety-utility trade-off among evaluated guardrails, and maintains an average end-to-end latency of 25 ms per call.
Wenhao Lin, Chen Yu, Xingwei Lin et al.· 2 citations
The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model, and this work formalizes an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda.
Albus W. Ng, Yibin Han, Jusheng Zhang et al.· 0 citations
In agentic distributed systems, an agent may be authorized to mutate external infrastructure while lacking evidence that the mutation is ready to execute. Cognitive Admission Control (CAC) makes this evidence requirement explicit. A policy maps a typed action and its modeled risk to assurance obligations specifying predicates, evidence classes, scope, freshness, and witness-set constraints. A deterministic evaluator distinguishes satisfied, violated, and unresolved obligations; unresolved conditions produce targeted evidence-acquisition requests. Successful admission produces a certificate binding the action, its witness manifest, and dispatch-time guards. We formalize the admission calculus and the assumptions connecting it to mediated execution. The guarantees are policy-relative: physical safety additionally requires sound evidence, an adequate environment model, and preservation of relevant conditions through the effect. A TypeScript prototype is evaluated in 2,730 controlled local trials with independent effect observation and matched fault schedules. Across 390 CAC trials, 120 effects complete without modeled harm and no harmful effects occur. A live-policy baseline achieves the same completion count but admits the constructed correlated-witness failure. Mechanism ablations isolate guard, evidence-class, structural-cut, and remediation behavior. A further 9,000 measurements exercise the complete local dispatch path with persistent replay protection. These results establish tested implementation behaviors and local costs, not production failure rates or comparisons of language-model capability.
AI agents can be interrupted while editing files, calling tools, or carrying out multi-step tasks. Restarting repeats completed work, but continuing from unverified or outdated progress can carry earlier errors forward. A saved state is not necessarily a suitable place to resume. We introduce recoverability as a system primitive that makes reuse an explicit decision: select a supported starting point and a permitted recovery action, or withhold automatic continuation. Its behavioral contract binds that choice to supporting evidence, execution, and independent checks. A reference architecture connects persistence, validation, and control, with complementary runtime instances testing distinct responsibilities. Four deterministic and 20 paired file challenges demonstrate that accurate restoration and successful completion can conceal disallowed starting points. Progress controls attribute retained work to shared restoration. Event-time tests show that permission must also constrain the action, and that independently held policy evidence can expose violations even after an effect occurs. These findings establish why recovery decisions need their own evaluation, beyond restored bytes and final task success. Within supplied policies and a declared trust model, the contribution is a common, testable interface for retaining justified progress and making the conditions for its reuse explicit and enforceable.
LoopHarness is presented, which restores a persistent, non-decaying safety state at the loop level at the loop level, and gives a complete evaluation protocol on native Agent-SafetyBench tasks with paired clean and attacked episodes, an outer-state attack suite whose decisive evidence exists only across iterations, per-module ablations, and an adaptive white-box red team.
Chenmin Wu, H. Jia, Yang Liu et al.· 0 citations
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