Unlearnable Faces: Privacy Protection Surviving Extraction Pipeline
TL;DR
LPID attains the lowest attacker accuracy of all methods in every setting the authors evaluate, holding the attacker below $10\% under crop+resize extraction on identities unseen at protection time, while remaining imperceptible at $32.7$\,dB PSNR and $0.161$ LPIPS.
Abstract
Unlearnable examples keep publicly shared photos from being learned by unauthorized face-recognition models. An imperceptible perturbation, added before sharing, makes any model trained on the protected photos fail on clean faces. The perturbation is crafted on the shared image, however the attacker trains on the face it extracts, cropped and resized to the recognizer input, and under this extraction the protection collapses. We propose LPID, which builds the extraction into the unlearnable-example objective. LPID confines the perturbation to the extracted face region and optimizes it through a differentiable model of the extraction, concentrating its energy in the frequency band the extraction preserves. Because this robustness is a property of the transform rather than of any identity, LPID is re-optimized per album and protects even users it has never seen. LPID attains the lowest attacker accuracy of all methods in every setting we evaluate, holding the attacker below $10\%$ under crop+resize extraction on identities unseen at protection time, while remaining imperceptible at $32.7$\,dB PSNR and $0.161$ LPIPS.