Rawls and Taxation

Abstract

John Rawls’s theory of justice is strikingly silent on taxation, despite its centrality to the maintenance of background justice. This paper argues that taxation must be seen not as a technical instrument of redistribution, but as a constitutive element of the basic structure, shaping property rights and distributive outcomes. Building on Murphy and Nagel’s institutional account of ownership (2002) and Sugin’s reading of Rawlsian justice (2004), I show that fiscal design is indispensable to securing fair equality of opportunity and the fair value of political liberties. Against the “narrow view” of public reason (Freeman 2003; Quong 2004), I contend that taxation belongs among the constitutional essentials and must satisfy the principle of publicity. While Rawls’s textual remarks occasionally allow proportional taxes, the internal logic of justice as fairness implies progressivity, necessary to prevent dynastic concentrations of wealth and to sustain reciprocity and legitimacy in a well-ordered society.