It is shown that a network is uniquely optimal for some informational environment if and only if the focal agent observes every predecessor, and that which network performs best depends critically on the informational environment.
Abstract
This paper studies how network structure affects information aggregation in social learning. Agents sequentially choose actions based on private signals and observations of neighbors'actions. Comparing a focal agent's expected payoff across networks at a finite period, we show that a network is uniquely optimal for some informational environment if and only if the focal agent observes every predecessor. This characterization reveals that which network performs best depends critically on the informational environment. We then revisit two important implications of the characterization through transparent constructions: the star network can uniquely outperform every alternative under binary signals, while the complete network can do so with richer signals. These constructions highlight a trade-off between the responsiveness effect and the overturning effect: sparse networks facilitate information aggregation by preserving the responsiveness of actions to private signals, whereas dense networks facilitate information aggregation by revealing extreme information that overturns existing public beliefs.
Consider a setting where N players, partitioned into K observable types, form a directed network. Agents’ preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g., agents may have preferences over their network centrality) and a private, or dyadic, component which is additively...
Andrin Pelican, Bryan S. Graham· The Review of Economic Studi...· 0 citations
This paper uncovers general properties of optimal information structures by exploiting a linear-programming formulation of information design. A critical observation is that an optimum can be found as ``sparse,''i.e., many coordinates of the action-state joint distribution are zero. This implies that, once part of an a...
Models of opinion dynamics on networks, provide a framework to study how a network of agents aggregates dispersed opinions into a consensus. However, existing models assume that agents truthfully report their opinions, and do not account for environments in which a platform aggregates agents'reports across multiple net...
This paper studies decentralized learning of socially optimal equilibria in finite normal-form games over dynamic communication networks. Each agent observes only its own realized payoffs, does not know the game a priori, and can communicate only with time-varying neighbors using low-bandwidth messages. We propose netw...
Seref Taha Kiremitci, Muhammed O. Sayin· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.