It is suggested that public responses to AI legal advisors are shaped not by rigid attitudes toward automation, but by the balancing of competing normative expectations, which have implications for theories of algorithm aversion and the design of AI recommendation systems in normatively salient domains.
Abstract
AI systems are increasingly used to provide legal advice, raising questions about whether laypeople accept guidance from algorithms--especially when that advice is legally correct but socially controversial. We report a preregistered survey experiment with 3,348 adults in mainland China examining how people evaluate identical legal advice when it is attributed either to an AI system or to a human lawyer, and when it is accompanied by reasoning or not. Contrary to expectations of algorithm aversion, attribution to an AI system has no net effect on perceived reasonableness. However, mediation analyses reveal opposing psychological pathways underlying this null result. AI-attributed advice is perceived as more objective, which increases perceived reasonableness, but also as less comprehensive and less attentive to special circumstances, which decreases perceived reasonableness. By contrast, providing legal reasoning substantially increases perceived reasonableness regardless of source, largely by enhancing perceptions of objectivity. Qualitative responses corroborate this tension between objectivity and contextual sensitivity in evaluations of legal advice. Together, these findings suggest that public responses to AI legal advisors are shaped not by rigid attitudes toward automation, but by the balancing of competing normative expectations. The results have implications for theories of algorithm aversion and the design of AI recommendation systems in normatively salient domains.
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