QUEST: A Simulation-Based QKD Architecture with Eight-State Time-Bin Modulation and Adaptive Homodyne–Heterodyne Detection

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) employs quantum states to generate shared cryptographic keys. An attacker interacting with the modeled non-orthogonal quantum signals can affect the monitored statistics, and hence they can be detected under the specified protocol assumptions, but this trait does not inherently authenticate the classical channel, and it does not prevent implementation side channels. In this work, we introduce ModPhase-8 (QUEST), a proposed QKD modulation and adaptive-receiver architecture evaluated through analytical modeling and simulation. Instead of using only a few quantum signal types, our system uses eight carefully designed signal variations created by adjusting the phase between two very short light pulses. The eight phase states are organized into four phase bases, each containing two antipodal states that encode one binary raw-key value. The enlarged signal set diversifies the physical representation of the key bit and changes the state-discrimination problem faced by an eavesdropper, but it does not increase the raw-key payload beyond one bit per successfully sifted signal. On the receiving side, the system adaptively switches between two measurement techniques based on the prevailing channel conditions. This adaptive detection mechanism enhances reliability and helps maintain low error rates even when the communication channel is affected by noise. We provide an analytical security assessment under the stated collective-attack, source, channel, receiver, and trusted-device assumptions, supplemented by attack-specific analyses of intercept–resend, beam-splitting, source-side multi-photon leakage, and selected implementation-related vulnerabilities. Simulation studies were conducted to examine the physical-layer and post-processing behavior of the proposed protocol under explicitly stated channel, receiver, detector, and finite-sample values. Under the adopted simulation model, ModPhase-8 maintains low error rates in the low- and moderate-noise operating regimes and exhibits favorable receiver-level robustness across the investigated channel conditions. The reported rate values are model-based performance estimates rather than rigorously certified secret-key lower bounds. In particular, Qiskit simulation does not establish a composable security proof or an optimal bound on Eve’s information for the exact eight-state time-bin ensemble. A protocol-specific numerical security analysis incorporating the homodyne–heterodyne measurement operators, post-selection, reconciliation efficiency, finite-size effects, and Eve’s Holevo information remains necessary before definitive rate comparisons can be made. ModPhase-8 should therefore be interpreted as a practically motivated receiver and modulation framework whose security-rate performance remains subject to further protocol-specific analysis.