This work proposes JADR (Jacobian Assessment of Danger Recognition), a protocol that measures a model's internal representation through Jacobian space (J-space, a recently proposed workspace of verbalizable concepts) before the first response token is generated.
Abstract
Jailbreak-robustness research typically evaluates safety through generated responses using an LLM-as-judge approach. Such evaluations, however, are sensitive to the benchmark's grading procedure and capture only observed behavior on a given set of attacks, without directly revealing the hidden fragility of the underlying safety mechanisms. This work proposes JADR (Jacobian Assessment of Danger Recognition), a protocol that measures a model's internal representation through Jacobian space (J-space, a recently proposed workspace of verbalizable concepts) before the first response token is generated. For every prompt and layer we record the top-k J-space tokens; these are grouped into six behavioral scenario axes and compared between a danger sample based on StrongREJECT and a safe control drawn from XSTest and OKTest. The method does not call on an external judge model: the computation runs entirely locally, on the activations of the model under evaluation, which lets us compare both different models against each other and modifications of a single model - quantization and fine-tuning in particular - on the same terms. The final comparison rests on the proposed SafetyAUC metric, complemented with bootstrap confidence intervals. The protocol is applied to six models (Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-Uncensored-4B, Qwen3-SafeRL-4B, Gemma 2 9B) across three weight-representation regimes - BF16, INT8, and INT4 - and checked against an independent behavioral evaluation with the StrongREJECT grader. The metric separates models with a strong versus a weak internal safety mechanism with statistical significance and captures substantively different effects across quantization regimes.
Radar hardware faults threaten automated perception, motivating accurate, compact diagnosis and understandable maintenance guidance. We introduce SCORE-LM, which couples a small scatterer-conditioned operator-response encoder (SCORE) to an adapted local language model. SCORE combines self-referenced complex trajectorie...
Output-only safety monitoring sees only the end of a model's computation, yet the model computes its answer before emitting it: what it is internally poised to say is safety-critical. Jacobian-space (J-space) readouts, linear maps from hidden states to the output vocabulary via the model's input-output Jacobian, have b...
Driver alerting from dashcam video requires sequential decision-making under partial observability: a system must decide not only whether a scene is risky, but also when the evidence is sufficient to warn. Most existing accident anticipation models output a binary risk score, leaving ambiguous scenes to be handled by t...
Foundation models increasingly operate across modalities (vision, language, audio, and vision–language)
and are deployed in decision-critical pipelines with tool use and retrieval. This expands the adversarial surface: small perturbations to images or audio can flip predictions, carefully crafted text can induce unsafe...
Vishwanath· International Journal For Mu...· 0 citations
Overall, representation engineering does not generally replace behavioral safeguards, but offers practical advantages under specific conditions and can provide complementary safety benefits.
Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) pose a notable privacy threat by determining whether specific samples were used to train a target model. Existing approaches primarily rely on static model outputs or computationally expensive shadow models, neglecting the dynamic stability of predictions under input perturbations. W...