Power, politics, and policy agency: towards a Functional Theory of Agency
Abstract
This article examines how political position shapes policy agency in local policy making. Specifically, it asks: what patterns of policy agency functions do municipal councillors ( regidores ) exhibit in the local policy process? Drawing on the Functional Theory of Agency framework and a sequential mixed-methods design combining a national survey of Mexican municipal councillors with follow-up semi-structured interviews, we analyse how councillors exercise four modes of policy agency: steering, innovation, intermediation, and intelligence. Our findings reveal systematic differences between majoritarian and opposition councillors. Majoritarian councillors dominate commissions, align with mayoral priorities, and primarily act as steerers and brokers of executive policy. By contrast, opposition councillors, who are often excluded from formal decision-making arenas, engage in disruptive innovation, cultivate vertical alliances beyond the municipality, and invest more heavily in knowledge production as a counter-power strategy. These distinct patterns suggest that political position shapes the policy agency functions available to local legislators and influences how they seek to affect policy outcomes. The article contributes to the consolidation of a Functional Theory of Agency by demonstrating how unequal access to formal policy-making authority structures actors’ behavioural repertoires within policy-making processes. It also advances comparative research on legislative actors by showing how local representatives adapt their policy agency strategies under conditions of unequal access to formal policy-making authority.