This work analyzed an isolate that resulted in a human fatality in 2025 and found that this strain lacks many key features of influenza viruses with epidemiological success in humans including reduced growth in human lung cultures, a pH of inactivation less than 5.0, and lack of transmission to cohoused recipient ferrets.
Abstract
In fall of 2025, a fatal infection of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus H5N5 occurred. To define the risk of this emerging virus to humans, we performed a comprehensive analysis based on our established triage. Serological analysis revealed that humans across all birth years had no detectable neutralizing antibodies to this H5N5 isolate. Further characterization revealed a lack of phenotypic signatures associated with epidemiologically successful influenza viruses in humans, including reduced replication in human airway cells and an avian-like pH of inactivation. Additionally, assessment of H5N5 in ferrets revealed a lack of direct contact transmission and moderate disease severity. H5N5 infection in ferrets with prior immunity against the 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain resulted in fewer clinical signs and reduced viral shedding. Together our data suggest that the current H5N5 HPAI lineage poses a low pandemic risk. Importance HPAI H5N5 viruses have caused widespread infection and death in avian species, and characterizing their pandemic risk traits is critical to understanding the threat posed to humans. In this work we analyzed an isolate that resulted in a human fatality in 2025. We found that this strain lacks many key features of influenza viruses with epidemiological success in humans including reduced growth in human lung cultures, a pH of inactivation less than 5.0, and lack of transmission to cohoused recipient ferrets. Prior immunity with seasonal H1N1 strain also reduced the viral load and disease burden of the virus. Taken together, these data suggest that currently circulating H5N5 poses a low risk to humans but highlights the importance of phenotypic characterizations for future risk assessments as the virus evolves in wild birds.
The replication kinetics, pathogenesis, and transmission of A/Washington/2148/2025 A(H5N5) virus show that A(H5N5) virus can replicate robustly in mammalian cells and cause severe disease but lacks adaptations supporting efficient airborne spread, informing assessment of the pandemic risk posed by genotype A6 influenza...
J. Pulit-Penaloza, J. Belser, N. Brock et al.· Journal of Virology· 1 citation
This review unites historical milestones, structural insights, epidemiological data, and recent cross-species findings to better define the current landscape of risk and transmission of HPAI viruses.
Leila Wogick, S. Goyal· Clinical Microbiology Review...· 0 citations
Swine influenza A viruses (IAV-S) caused the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and pose a future zoonotic and pandemic threat. Vietnam represents a critical hotspot for IAV-S emergence within East and Southeast Asia, with dense swine and human populations and intensive livestock trade. We conducted genomic surveillance of IAV-S in Vi...
N. A. Bui, Z. Song, Samuel M. S. Cheng et al.· Emerging Infectious Diseases· 0 citations
The global spillover of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into mammalian hosts has become a public health concern as well as to the equine industry. However, previous reports on H5N1 natural infection and the presence of specific antibodies in horses remain limited. Therefore, we conducted a s...
Nanako Kawanishi, Takahiro Hiono, Yoshinori Kambayashi et al.· Journal of Equine Veterinary...· 0 citations
The emergence of novel influenza strains through reverse-zoonotic transmission poses potential risks to both animal and human health. This study characterized a naturally isolated reassortant canine H3N2 virus carrying the matrix (M) gene of 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus. In vitro experiments revealed that the M variant c...
This article argues that reassortment, rather than point mutation alone, might be an underrecognized driver of zoonotic risk in endemic H5N1 lineages and is reshaping those lineages, and examines why such events might be underrecognized in settings with entrenched poultry influenza.
A. M. Byrne, Lorcan Carnegie, N. Lewis et al.· Emerging Infectious Diseases· 0 citations
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