Existing methods for risk-limiting audits typically focus on certifying individual contests. In parliamentary elections, however, the politically relevant outcome is often whether a party has won enough seats to form government, not whether every reported seat outcome is correct. Extending on the work of Mohanty et al. (2019), we formulate the certification of a parliamentary majority as a partial conjunction testing problem: it is enough to verify that the reported winning party truly won at least a majority of its reported seats. Building on the SHANGRLA auditing framework, we construct a sequential audit statistic for the majority outcome by combining seat-level statistics. We then propose adaptive sampling strategies that allocate auditing effort across seats, including variants that learn to avoid spending excessive effort on seats that appear unlikely to have been truly won. Using simulations based on synthetic and real data, from the 2014 Indian Lok Sabha election, we show that auditing the parliamentary majority can substantially reduce the number of ballots inspected (by almost a thousand-fold) compared to certifying every reported winning seat.
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is an algorithmic election rule. Round by round, a profile of ranked-choice ballots is reinterpreted to determine which decision to make next, and candidates are seated or eliminated until a full winner set emerges. This algorithmic nature makes STV theoretically more brittle than oth...
Whether a language model looks demographically biased can depend on how the audit asks its question. A charitable-aid benchmark reports that the same models favor minority applicants when rating requests one at a time and penalize some when ranking side by side. We test whether that reversal generalizes to hiring, lend...
Large language models are often asked which input factors influenced their outputs. For structured inputs, such reports can be checked by counterfactual perturbation, but each factor must be queried multiple times to estimate its effect, so verification is usually budget-limited. We study how this limited-budget settin...
Tao-Lin Zhang, Han-Yu Wang, Jiu-Heng Wan et al.· 0 citations
We develop a modeling and reporting framework for quantifying how pre-electoral coalition formation may alter parliamentary representation under the Jefferson--D'Hondt apportionment rule. Polls are usually presented as point estimates of vote shares, yet the objects that matter for representation are integer seat vec...
Aleksandar Hatzivelkos· Croatian Operational Researc...· 0 citations
Cowley, Webb and Bale’s critique of within-party sortition argues that lotteries among party members cannot produce a socially representative UK Parliament because party memberships are unrepresentative. Drawing on Party Members Project data, they show that random selection would produce only mixed improvements in desc...
Robert Rosenberg· Party Politics· 1 citation
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