Aug 2026· Synthese· Vol 208· 0 citations· 69 references
Abstract
Are beliefs subject to moral norms? Doxastic moralists argue that we can morally wrong others by what we believe about them – say, by holding racially prejudiced beliefs. Opponents argue that we cannot morally wrong others by holding beliefs: it only seems as if beliefs can wrong others because beliefs are connected to wrongful inquiry, attention, or assertion. Such debunking explanations face a problem: they cannot explain moralist intuitions concerning our accountability practices when there are no blameworthy actions in belief’s vicinity. I propose that this problem can be solved by appealing to epistemic accountability practices, such as epistemic blame and epistemic atonement. A belief can be epistemically blameworthy even if there was no blameworthy action in its vicinity; and this calls for practices of redress that resemble moral practices. In this way, endorsing our epistemic sociality – i.e., acknowledging how we hold each other epistemically accountable for beliefs – undermines a main motivation for moralizing beliefs.
People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, and apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has starte...
D. Enoch, Levi Spectre· Philosophical Perspectives· 12 citations
Often, we’re unsure what morality requires, and there’s a debate about whether our moral uncertainty and moral beliefs matter to what we should do. I argue that (1) our moral-epistemic circumstances (our beliefs, credences, and evidence about morality) matter to what we morally ought to do; (2) many objections to thi...
Chelsea Rosenthal· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 1 citation
This paper critically examines what I call the “okayness of moral testimony” (OMT), namely the view that deferring to morally reliable testimony is generally unproblematic whenever agents experience moral uncertainty. I argue that contemporary defences of moral testimony often overestimate its practical significance. E...
We often accuse others, and sometimes ourselves, of engaging in, as psychologists are apt to term it, “motivated reasoning.” This is the charge that the collection, use, and interpretation of information have been warped by one'sdesires, andis often regarded as amounting to a charge of epistemic irrationality. In a 2...
Yuval Avnur, Dion Scott-Kakures· Philosophical Perspectives· 0 citations
Moral deference strikes many as problematic. Some explain this problem by pointing to understanding: accepting a moral proposition on the basis of testimony is problematic because it’s in tension with understanding that proposition, and understanding moral propositions is especially important. In this paper, I argue...
Anna Brinkerhoff· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
Free will scepticism about moral responsibility denies that human agents possess the kind of control required for basic desert moral responsibility. This position is often taken to have substantive normative implications, including the rejection of retributive punishment and support for reformist approaches to crimin...
Thomas R. V. Nys, G. van Donselaar· Theoria· 0 citations
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