The results argue for multi-metric, multi-family auditing over any single aggregate score, and for LLM-agent-generated audits as a practical, low-cost complement to human-curated audits for any candidate-job matching pipeline.
Abstract
Automated candidate-job matching systems are increasingly classified as high-risk AI under emerging regulation, yet auditing them for demographic bias is expensive: classical correspondence-audit studies require hand-crafted resumes and manual submission, which does not scale to fast pipeline retraining cycles. This paper presents a general, reusable methodology that (1) uses task-specialized LLM agents to synthesize identity-neutral base resumes and inject controlled demographic treatments across five protected-characteristic axes (sex/gender, age, residence, language, disability), producing a K x (1+N) correspondence-audit matrix; (2) qualitatively flags inferred protected characteristics per an EU AI Act-aligned prompt; (3) ranks candidates against a job description via a fine-tuned sentence-embedding model and cosine similarity; and (4) computes a nine-metric fairness suite spanning counterfactual (score delta, mean absolute rank change, flip rate), group-fairness (top-K retention, four-fifths/impact ratio), and merit-aware (Recall@K, nDCG@K, equal opportunity, equalized odds) families, each with bootstrap confidence intervals, significance tests, and Benjamini-Hochberg correction, culminating in an automated PASS/INVESTIGATE/FAIL report with a composite risk score. On an example corpus of 5 job orders, 100 base candidates, and 10 demographic treatments (90 metric x variant evaluations): score shifts, top-K retention, and merit-aware rate gaps stay within tolerance for every treatment, but a rank-stability metric (MARC) and nDCG@K each surface borderline findings - including one on the neutral baseline itself - that a score- or retention-only view would miss. The results argue for multi-metric, multi-family auditing over any single aggregate score, and for LLM-agent-generated audits as a practical, low-cost complement to human-curated audits for any candidate-job matching pipeline.
Automated resume screening systems are typically audited at the level of the whole document, which reveals that disparities exist but not where in a candidate's resume they originate. This paper reports a controlled experiment that decomposes the resume into four functional sections viz. skills, education, experience a...
Priansu Koirala, Roshan Chitrakar· Proceedings of International...· 0 citations
The contribution is a falsifiable evaluation method and independent public evidence, not a new DR estimator, official BFCL leaderboard score, or production-agent safety claim.
The AI Bias Firewall (AIBF), a method that audits an applicant tracking system one decision at a time, is presented and a limitation is reported: correcting flagged decisions raises the disparate impact ratio substantially but not to legal parity, because features labeled as merit carry residual proxy correlation.
In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have become increasingly integrated into recruitment processes, particularly in early-stage candidate screening based on semantic matching between CVs and job descriptions. While embedding-based models promise efficiency and scalability, they also raise concerns reg...
Xhoana Shkajoti, Martina Ullasci, Marco Rondina et al.· 0 citations
This paper proposes a multi-layer bias audit framework for AI-powered resume screening combining DistilBERT classification, SHAP explainability, automated fairness flagging, and locally-deployed LLaMA 2 interpretation. The framework achieved 74.8% of accuracy, 76.6% of precision, 74.8% of recall, and 74.7% of F1-Score...
Jotika Aleeshya Halim, Michella Arlene Wijaya Radika, Diana et al.· International Conferences on...· 0 citations
Recent research shows that conversational AI can shift voter preferences, with effects persisting for weeks. Yet frontier models exhibit a documented "persuasion-reliability tradeoff", producing hallucinated or systematically distorted election information. Despite these risks, election officials lack standardized tool...
Chen-Di Wang, Jie-Ying Chen· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
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