A cognitive architecture is more than the module that reasons: it must also decide how long to think and what deserves the effort. We built a minimal but complete system - a recurrent reasoner with adaptive halting, a homeostatic control field, and a value module - and asked of each part: does this function emerge from gradient descent, or must it be computed? Competence emerges. Stopping appears to emerge too, and to be worth more than everything decidable in advance, but that appearance is instrumentation: payoff at matched mean compute climbs from 0.467 (uniform) through 0.546 (difficulty) to 0.698 (ex-ante value), and the further climb to 0.921 (posterior self-observation) does not survive audit. PonderNet-style halting returns a halting-weighted mixture of hidden states while forced-depth baselines return one, and the language head is trained on the mixture alone; equalizing the readout annihilates the apparent advantage of native execution (residual +0.000 [0.000, 0.000]). Value does not emerge: trained couplings capture zero of a payoff an explicit allocator captures completely (+0.151, routing correlation +0.79), so the second-order decisions that pay must be computed, at least where value is orthogonal to content, as here by construction. On a frozen LLM actuator the same instruments show self-consistency voting to be a measured bound (+0.0236 [+0.0150, +0.0326]) and inter-sample agreement nearly worthless as a stopping signal, its mass concentrating on wrong answers. Every null we assert carries a mechanism and a positive control, and the protocol is part of the contribution. Executing our own falsifiable prediction, value under commitment pays +0.1312 [+0.1124, +0.1502] in a cliff-cost family, some seven times the smooth-family estimate - not because the cliff shifts information ex ante, but because it multiplies the attainable range fivefold (5.1x [3.4, 8.2]).
A discrete Schur-Cohn criterion for Verlet with velocity coupling, necessary and sufficient per latent root, with no commutation hypothesis is proved here: a discrete Schur-Cohn criterion for Verlet with velocity coupling.
F. Arrabal-Campos, Ignacio Fernández, Francisco G. Montoya et al.· 1 citation
Across neurological and neuropsychiatric conditions, patients often know what they should do yet cannot bring themselves to do it. This dissociation between intact knowledge and failed implementation, which we call the knowing-doing gap, is clinically important but lacks a unified, measurable account. We propose that c...
Yuxin Zhang· Frontiers in Neuroscience· 0 citations
Small cognitively fine-tuned models show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.
A small detector is trained to predict the internal development of answer readiness and stop reasoning at that point, connecting the internal development of answer readiness to a practical rule for allocating reasoning computation.
Anacreon is introduced, an audience simulation model that targets the individual level within a narrow, well-specified domain and reaches a state-of-the-art ordinal alignment of 0.775, the individual-level accuracy measure on which the field has converged, with a small residual bias.
The mechanism is a halt vector: a difference-of-means direction at layer 18 of this model whose steering strength controls how long it thinks, while a replicated value axis does nothing, and what works is reconstructing the whole steered activation with those dimensions pinned to their natural values.
Dylan Jayabahu, Tinuade Adeleke· 0 citations
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