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Policy Optimization and Statistical Inference for Online Contextual Matrix Games

Aug 2026 · 0 citations
Mathematics Computer Science

TL;DR

This work introduces online contextual matrix games and proposes OnGameLearn, an online learning algorithm that efficiently balances exploration and exploitation across both player actions and contexts and effectively navigates the intertwined challenges of strategic and contextual decision-making.

Abstract

Online decision making often requires navigating a landscape shaped by both dynamic contexts and strategic interactions. In competitive pricing, for example, hotels must account for both dynamic contextual factors and rivals'strategic responses. Existing approaches address only part of this challenge: contextual bandits optimize single-agent decisions using observable features but ignore multi-player interactions, while online matrix games capture strategic behavior through Nash equilibrium but assume fixed payoffs, ignoring contextual information. How should agents act then when strategic payoffs evolve with contextual signals? We introduce \emph{online contextual matrix games} to integrate contextual information into multi-player online games. We further propose \emph{OnGameLearn}, an online learning algorithm that efficiently balances exploration and exploitation across both player actions and contexts. This approach comes with statistical guarantees: tail bounds for the estimated payoff matrix, the convergence of the estimated Nash equilibrium, the asymptotic normality of the parameter estimators, and the sublinear regret bound. We also develop the notion of \emph{policy value} in matrix games and develop a doubly robust, $\sqrt{T}$-consistent estimator for it. Across simulated studies and a real-world hotel pricing application, we find that OnGameLearn effectively navigates the intertwined challenges of strategic and contextual decision-making.

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