Analyzing the Interaction of Optimal Strategies in Mean-Payoff Bidding Games

Abstract

A common assumption when designing an agent in a multi-agent system is that the other agents behave adversarially. This allows a designer to obtain the strongest guarantees when they have no control over nor knowledge about the other agents'behavior. However, when all agents are designed under this adversarial assumption, their actual interaction is not adversarial (e.g., when all players play defensively, no player actually attacks). In such settings, we would like to know what behavior arises in the multi-agent system. However, analyzing the interaction among agents is notoriously challenging, both mathematically and algorithmically. In this paper, we provide such an analysis, focusing on bidding games, played by two agents on a graph as follows. A token is placed on a vertex, and in each turn an auction (bidding) determines which agent moves the token, thus generating an infinite path that determines the agents'utilities. We consider mean-payoff objectives; each vertex is associated with a reward for each player, and the utility in an infinite play is the limit average of the rewards. We analyze the play that is generated when each agent follows a strategy that optimizes against an adversary, and consider the two known explicit constructions of optimal strategies. The technical challenge stems from the infinitely-many configurations of a bidding game and their complicated dynamics. We show that, under some restrictions, the generated play is ultimately periodic, and develop algorithms to compute the players'utilities in it.