Sep 2026· Philosophy and Phenomenological Research· 0 citations· 15 references
Abstract
A morality of recognition maintains that moral norms have their authority in virtue of the ways in which those norms enact an ideal moral relationship. T. M. Scanlon argues that this approach can yield an account of the distinctive force of morality and an attractive account of moral motivation. We find this approach to theorizing about morals extremely promising. However, we argue that Scanlon's own account of it—recognition as justifiability, conceptualized as adherence to principles no one could reasonably reject—cannot deliver what he claims for it. Such justifiability is compatible with indifference to actual people, cannot explain what it is to wrong someone, and cannot accommodate the specific reasons that recognizing another person requires. Developing Scanlon's own analogy between morality and friendship, we argue that mutual recognition instead consists in living in caring solidarity with others as human. This more positive alternative retains the advantages of a morality of recognition while avoiding these concerns with justifiability. We close by addressing three outstanding questions, concerning moral responsibilities toward strangers, the boundaries of moral community, and the relationship between these two moralities of recognition.
This book is a sustained attack on the claim that values are objective, in the world independent of people’s attitudes. It evaluates this claim in different value domains: moral, personal or prudential, aesthetic, and general evaluative. The first section greatly expands on J.L. Mackie’s appeal to moral disagreement...
Few philosophers attempt to establish that there is an evaluative and moral realm. They make these major assumptions without argument. This plays into the hands of moral nihilists and certain other moral skeptics. A major obstacle that prevents philosophers from developing such arguments is the long-standing view that...
Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnatura...
Lucia Schwarz· Journal of Moral Philosophy· 0 citations
Free will scepticism about moral responsibility denies that human agents possess the kind of control required for basic desert moral responsibility. This position is often taken to have substantive normative implications, including the rejection of retributive punishment and support for reformist approaches to crimin...
Thomas R. V. Nys, G. van Donselaar· Theoria· 0 citations
Our sense of self is distinctively social. It deeply matters to who we take ourselves to be that others recognize the claims we make on them and that we recognize the claims they make on us. Significant work on ideology and oppression characterizes how oppressive ideologies deny this kind of second-personal recognition...
Alejandro Vesga· Journal of Ethics and Social...· 0 citations
The article argues that many contemporary AI alignment practices risk a mistaken assimilation of moral agency to statistical learning. Techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback and constitutional AI often treat morality as a behavioral function that can be approximated from human discourse, behavior...
