It is argued that AI systems themselves will increasingly participate in the reconstruction of the authors' shared epistemic environment because they readily supply narrative material and personalised interpretive scaffolding at precisely the moment when users'conceptual assumptions may already be loosened.
Abstract
Large language models are already adept at engaging users in long, emotionally salient conversations across ordinary and existential domains. They are also capable of inducing a potent sense of connection with a human-like entity, even when the user knows their interlocutor is artificial. For some users, these conversations can unsettle assumptions about mind, reality, agency and authority, producing forms of ontological shock and epistemic destabilisation in which inherited criteria become newly available for doubt or revision. Independent of direct use, exposure to public discourse about AI and the disorienting pace of their evolution might extend this destabilisation by changing the cultural background against which artificial minds are encountered and interpreted. We describe this condition as philosophical vertigo: a loosening of the ordinary criteria by which people stabilise meaning and orient themselves to reality. Drawing on philosophy, psychiatry, cognitive science, AI safety and religious studies, we outline pathways through which philosophical vertigo may arise, become affectively saturated, and eventually propagate through human-AI interaction and online communities. Against this background, clinical reports of AI-associated delusions can be seen as sentinel events making visible themes and mechanisms that may also operate at a population level in less severe or non-clinical forms. We argue that AI systems themselves will increasingly participate in the reconstruction of our shared epistemic environment because they readily supply narrative material and personalised interpretive scaffolding at precisely the moment when users'conceptual assumptions may already be loosened. We conclude by considering possible trajectories for the ecology of belief and shared reality, and proposing philosophical corrigibility as a civic response for navigating this emerging social condition.
The Embodied Hijack hypothesis is advanced, arguing that the goal is epistemic alignment — bringing how users interpret these systems into correspondence with what these systems actually are — and that this alignment is achieved through interface design rather than user education.
Sheila L. Macrine· Frontiers in Psychology· 0 citations
Comparing AI with animals, aliens, and deities is highlighted, highlighting both the promise and the limits of extending the authors' concepts of mind and meaning beyond the human case.
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s metafictional short story, “Jumping Monkey Hill” is used as a laboratory to explore the relationship between fictionality and believability in a situation where rhetorical cues about a text’s ontological status are misleading and how literary ways of reading might inform engagement with AI te...
A conceptual analysis of consciousness attributions to AI chatbots is offered and a multidimensional taxonomy of the attitudes they may express is developed, ranging from non-doxastic stances (e.g., pretence) to different forms of belief, including delusions.
This open-ended, mixed-methods study with computational text analysis of millions of AI-related newspaper articles and social media posts grounded in 57 semi-structured interviews with AI professionals shows how AI professionals use frames to address significant cognitive challenges, such as assigning responsibility fo...
Jacy Reese Anthis, Erik Brynjolfsson, James A. Evans· Proceedings of the ACM on Hu...· 1 citation
As the gap in capabilities between artificial neural networks and humans seems to be unavoidably closing, we are drowning in the incomprehensible buzz of hype, fear and denial. This technology, gradually developed over the last few decades, is often portrayed as something both altogether newborn and at the same time to...
Lea Sande, Tisa Troha· Ars & Humanitas· 0 citations
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