Jul 2026· Ars & Humanitas· Vol 20, pp. 71-84· 0 citations
Abstract
As the gap in capabilities between artificial neural networks and humans seems to be unavoidably closing, we are drowning in the incomprehensible buzz of hype, fear and denial. This technology, gradually developed over the last few decades, is often portrayed as something both altogether newborn and at the same time too abstract and alien to be considered human to any extent. Historically, antihumanist positions can be construed as more or less discrete deconstructions of humanist exceptionalism’s many manifestations, while still proceeding from its essentialist premises all the same. An attempt at stating this false dichotomy’s central problem anew, inhumanism is a distillation of the human rational core as the capacity-for and commitment-to continuous normative self-revision in the discursive space of reasons. In this paper we argue that there are meaningful similarities between how large language models (LLMs) and humans structure their respective images of the world, and that these similarities can inform our self-understanding and our commitments. To this end, we present a preliminary exploration of artificial neural networks as a mirror for humanity’s selfexamination, in view of the way LLMs’ latent spaces robustly embed semantic maps of meaning as vectors. The same process is at work with platform user data embeddings, materialized through informing the corporations’ counterintuitive algorithmic meta manoeuvres with massive quantities of vectorized behavioural data. In light of speculative insight into the metastability of LLMs’ semiotically encoded orientation, we see the volatility of LLMs’ vectorial value alignment not only as a challenge, but simultaneously as an opportunity.
A unified vision is offered: intelligence arises from constrained architectures and emergent patterns, and as AI systems become more autonomous, they may require surrogate forms of consciousness to handle complex, real-world challenges—though these will never fully replicate the biological original.
John-Michael M. Kuczynski· Communication & Cognitio...· 0 citations
It is argued that AI systems themselves will increasingly participate in the reconstruction of the authors' shared epistemic environment because they readily supply narrative material and personalised interpretive scaffolding at precisely the moment when users'conceptual assumptions may already be loosened.
T. Pollak, H. Morrin, Murray Shanahan· 0 citations
Gerard Johnstone’s M3GAN (2022) presents artificial intelligence not merely as a technological threat but as a challenge to the conceptual boundaries through which humanity defines itself. The film centres on M3GAN, an artificially intelligent humanoid doll created to become a child’s companion and protector, but her i...
Dhanya Ravindran R.K· International Journal of Eng...· 0 citations
The Embodied Hijack hypothesis is advanced, arguing that the goal is epistemic alignment — bringing how users interpret these systems into correspondence with what these systems actually are — and that this alignment is achieved through interface design rather than user education.
Sheila L. Macrine· Frontiers in Psychology· 0 citations
Artificial systems increasingly behave in ways that resemble humans. But is that sufficient to make us see them as conscious, or as having related mental states? We contrast two broad possibilities. People may rely on a single general principle: the more appropriately an agent responds to its environment, the more cons...
Louis Longin, Jurgis Karpus, N. Meertens et al.· Cognition· 0 citations