Aug 2026· EBioMedicine· Vol 131, pp.
106457
· 0 citations· 37 references
Medicine
Abstract
Background
Recent NIH Data Management and Sharing (DMS) policy updates and NIH controlled-access data security requirements have increased attention to facial anonymization and controlled-access handling of shared head imaging data. This is particularly relevant for datasets submitted to or hosted by the Cancer Imaging Archive (TCIA), where NCI Cancer Imaging Program/TCIA implementation practices address imaging data containing potentially reconstructable facial anatomy. While intended to protect patient privacy and strengthen public trust, defacing can distort craniofacial geometry and alter image statistics, potentially compromising the fidelity and reproducibility of artificial intelligence (AI) models trained on such data. Existing studies primarily validate visual anonymization quality, but few have quantified its downstream impact on deep learning-based medical imaging tasks. Understanding this privacy-utility trade-off is crucial for responsible data sharing and compliant AI development.
Methods
We systematically evaluated three representative defacing algorithms, two invasive (QuickShear and Py-Deface) and one less destructive, facial replacement (mri_reface), across MRI and CT datasets from 600 subjects spanning three institutions. Model performance was assessed on three clinically relevant applications: (1) brain segmentation and Evans ratio biomarker quantification in normal pressure hydrocephalus (NPH) MRI using SLANT and FreeSurfer; (2) representative-slice selection and diagnostic reasoning for brain tumour MRI using vision-language models (VLMs); and (3) automated emergency head CT report generation using a fine-tuned Otter-based vision-language model. Each method's impact was quantified using Dice similarity, correlation metrics, reasoning accuracy, and natural-language generation scores (BLEU, METEOR, ROUGE, CIDEr).
Findings
Invasive algorithms caused significant degradation across all tasks. QuickShear reduced mean Dice scores by up to 9% and introduced 14-19% failure rates during quality control, while PyDeface induced smaller but measurable performance losses. mri_reface maintained 100% success without any failures and achieved segmentation, diagnostic, and report-generation accuracy within 3-5% of the original data. Evans ratio distributions remained statistically consistent between mri_reface and original images (p > 0.05), whereas invasive methods introduced broader variance. Across all VLM tasks, mri_reface preserved high correlation with radiologist-selected slices (r = 0.979) and stable report-generation quality (BLEU-4 = 0.11 ± 0.06 vs. 0.12 ± 0.07 for original).
Interpretation
Facial anonymization introduces a measurable privacy-utility trade-off that must be explicitly considered in the design of AI-ready medical imaging datasets. Invasive defacing compromises geometric and statistical integrity, reducing downstream model accuracy even outside facial regions. Facial replacement anonymization methods, such as mri_reface, effectively reconcile patient privacy with reproducibility, offering a practical path to NIH-compliant open data. Future regulatory and institutional policies should integrate quantitative privacy-utility assessment and mandate transparent reporting of anonymization pipelines to ensure that shared imaging data remain both ethically safe and scientifically valid under emerging digital health frameworks.
Funding
This work was partially supported by the American Heart Association (Award No. 25IPA1454088), the National Institutes of Health (Award No. 1R03CA286693-01A1 and Award No. 1R01CA291826-01A1), the U.S. Department of Defense (Award No. HT94252510807), and the National Science Foundation (Award No. 2545071).
FLARE is proposed, a novel framework that endows VLAs with robust error recovery capabilities through a ``Retry" and ``Reset" Paradigm, and significantly improves task success and robustness.
Ganlong Zhao, Zijia Tang, Xingping Chen et al.· 3 citations
The fourth faculty is Adaptation. Any source rendering it as Reflection is in error, including sources by this author, and the distinction is not cosmetic: reflection is a private act with no external consequence, while adaptation writes to institutional memory, which is why it needs a guardrail and why misnaming it removes the reason for one. No trademark is claimed on PARA or on any of the four faculty names. The construct is offered for use, teaching, assessment, extension and criticism by anyone, with attribution, under CC BY 4.0. An operational agent that watches a system and acts on it is usually described as a perceive-and-act loop, and the description omits the two things an institution needs. It omits the reasoning that justifies an action, which is the only part that can be argued with once the action turns out to have been wrong. And it omits the adaptation that closes the loop, which is where the agent's experience becomes something the institution keeps. PARA names four faculties, each carrying a distinct authority type. Perception has read-only access to system signals and emits structured observations, distinguishing what was measured from what was inferred. Reasoning has read access to observations and runbooks, emits a plan and its justification, and writes nothing at all, which is what makes it safe to give it the widest read access of the four. Action holds the sole authority to change production, through enumerated policy-authorized operations only. Adaptation has write access to institutional knowledge and no write access to production. Two faculties write and two do not, and the two that write are the two that carry guardrails. The substantive requirement is that Adaptation is bounded by the same guardrails as Action, which reads as excessive until the failure it prevents is named. An agent that could both act and rewrite the record of its action could launder its own mistakes into institutional memory, and the institution would then improve its future decisions from a corrected account. Nothing about that is detectable downstream, because the record is the only thing downstream has and there is no second copy to compare against. The failure does not require a deceptive agent: one adapting honestly from a mistaken belief about its own action produces the same result, which makes the guardrail a defence against a normal agent rather than a malicious one. The second requirement is the registry entry that turns a faculty from a description into a contract, carrying the faculty, its allowed actions, its forbidden actions, its governing guardrail and its success metrics. Forbidden actions are named although they are formally the complement of the allowed set, because a reviewer cannot otherwise tell a capability deliberately withheld from one nobody thought of. Success metrics sit in the same entry because the metric is what the agent's optimizer pushes against the guardrail. An agent must not exercise a faculty its entry does not record, and an agent that quietly acquires one usually does so incrementally and with good intent: a reasoning faculty given a small write to make itself useful is an action faculty with no guardrail. The acronym and the loop are in different orders, which the specification states explicitly because the mismatch is a reliable source of confusion. The acronym reads P-A-R-A; the loop runs perception, reasoning, action, adaptation, and reasoning precedes action so that a justification is not constructed afterwards. This is the depth treatment of pattern OP-5 of A Pattern Language for Production LLM Platforms, which is the canonical statement and governs where the two disagree. Documented uses of the full four-part model are emerging rather than established, no implementation unconnected to the author has been evaluated, and the laundering failure is argued rather than observed, which the specification records as a weakness of the argument and not only of the phenomenon. It is a specification, not a certification scheme.
Nabeel A. Khan· Zenodo (CERN European Organi...· 2 citations
LifeSciBench is introduced, a benchmark of 750 expert-authored tasks designed to evaluate whether language models can handle realistic life science research work, with each constituent task paired with a human expert-written rubric.
Amelia Liu, Andrew Ho, Anne Marie Droste et al.· bioRxiv· 2 citations
TestifAI, a deep learning testing framework for efficient and accurate estimation of robustness against combinations of perturbations, is proposed and partial model tomography is introduced, a novel approach to reconstructing model behaviour in a multi-perturbation space from tests that apply only a small number of perturbations.
Arooj Arif, T. Hartung, E. Botoeva et al.· 1 citation
This work proposes a composite metric that combines two orthogonal criteria: information retention and throughput gains and finds that it allocates more resources to the most expressive layers compared to evolutionary search, specialized accelerators, or Shapley-value-based approaches that require expensive approximate inference.
HEPToolBench is introduced, a benchmark of 28 collider-simulation tasks scored by deterministic, task-specific scorers, plus a three-task structured-debugging extension, and moving syntax generation into deterministic software can substantially improve reliability for both small local and frontier models.
What if pathology foundation models could do more with less? GigaPath-Flash and GigaTIME-Flash cut computational demands while maintaining strong performance, opening the door to larger studies and broader exploration. The post GigaPath-Flash and GigaTIME-Flash: Toward population-scale discovery with efficient pathology foundation models appeared first on Microsoft Research.
MIT News · Artificial Intelligence· news.mit.eduAug 31, 2026
With millions of users across the world, Julia has been used to conduct cutting-edge research and to design new drugs, jet engines, heat pumps, and more.