Whether a few trusted normal images can safely recover useful normal patches from such references without defect masks is studied, and the proposed bank improves over naive expansion, with a mean gain of 0.0142 AUPRC.
Abstract
Patch-memory anomaly detectors assume that their reference bank is normal, an assumption that is difficult to guarantee when additional industrial images are unverified. We study whether a few trusted normal images can safely recover useful normal patches from such references without defect masks. Starting from the DINOv2 patch-memory formulation used by AnomalyDINO, we score candidate patches by distance to a clean seed bank, discard the most suspicious 20%, merge the retained patches with the seed, and enforce a fixed budget by greedy coreset selection. On Severstal, naive additional references contain 9.46% anomalous patches; the proposed trim rejects 78.1\% of them and reduces residual contamination to 2.59%. At an equal 51,200-patch development budget, the proposed bank reaches 0.1084 AUPRC versus 0.0950 for naive expansion, 0.0952 for random removal, and 0.1030 for eight clean images. Injecting only 0.5\% anomalous patches into a clean bank reduces AUPRC from 0.1030 to 0.0759. On all five completed held-out pairs, the proposed bank improves over naive expansion, with a mean gain of 0.0142 AUPRC. Reference purity is therefore a first-order design variable, and unverified images are useful only when their contribution is filtered explicitly.
Normal-only industrial anomaly detectors use patches from clean training images as normal references or reconstruction targets. This assumes that clean patches are sufficient for the normal regions encountered at test time. We test that assumption directly. On MVTec AD, admitting ground-truth-normal patches from real d...
Industrial inspection must detect and localise defects when new production lines provide only a few defect-free reference images. On MVTec AD 2, few-shot evidence remains fragmented across reference budgets, seeds, and metrics, obscuring which design choices matter. We close this gap with the first systematic multi-bas...
This work uses CLEANCON, an out-of-bag cross-image support gate that changes candidate-image eligibility while fixing the representation, absolute mem- ory size, builder, and inference rule, to probe this coupling with sparse training contamination.
Visual anomaly detectors based on frozen foundation-model features commonly score distances from test patches to a memory of normal features. Benign acquisition changes can also enlarge these distances, confounding domain variation with defects. We investigate whether structured decomposition of nearest-normal DINOv2 r...
Few-shot anomaly detectors are judged by ranking metrics, yet deployment requires an alarm threshold with a controlled false-alarm rate (FAR). We ask how much normal evidence, in images or category units, is needed to certify such a threshold for an unseen category. Using a frozen DINOv2 principal component analysis (P...
Anomaly detectors are hardest to deploy exactly where training data is scarcest: a newly commissioned production line has a handful of verified"golden"samples and no machine-learning engineer on the factory floor. We present a training-free human-in-the-loop framework in which a domain expert corrects a PatchCore detec...
Ayusha Abbas, Saram Abbas, K. Adhikari· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.