This work compares a scaled-Manhattan matcher, a gradient-boosted classifier, a gradient-boosted classifier, a TypeNet-style recurrent embedding model, and a TypeFormer-style Transformer under a 5-fold subject-disjoint protocol and a design that jointly varies mechanism and the enrolment-to-query gap, and proves large and systematic template ageing proves large and systematic.
Abstract
Behavioural biometric templates are widely believed to degrade as the gap between enrolment and verification grows, but few studies measure this template ageing effect directly under controlled conditions. We collected a longitudinal dataset of 40 fixed passwords, each typed four times per weekly session over eight consecutive weeks. We compare a scaled-Manhattan matcher (M1), a gradient-boosted classifier (M2), a TypeNet-style recurrent embedding model (M3), and a TypeFormer-style Transformer (M4) under a 5-fold subject-disjoint protocol and a design that jointly varies mechanism and the enrolment-to-query gap, from 0 to 7 weeks. Template ageing proves large and systematic. Error increases monotonically with the gap for every mechanism, from an EER of 14.6-27.2% at a gap of zero to 25.5-37.1% at seven weeks, or 1.7% of decision error per week elapsed (p<0.001). However, the choice of mechanism matters more than its rate of ageing. Baseline accuracy spans 12.6 percentage points across the four mechanisms, the degradation each accumulates over seven weeks spans only 2.3 points, and ageing never reorders them. A matcher can therefore be chosen on same-session accuracy, with ageing managed by re-enrolment scheduling rather than by matcher selection. The two properties are nonetheless distinct, as M3 is the least accurate mechanism yet ages significantly more slowly than M1 under every specification tested. Training randomness also matters differently by architecture, with 58% of the recurrent model's fold-to-fold variance attributable to seed noise against 19% for the Transformer. Because the smaller ageing-rate differences are sensitive to modelling choices, while the accuracy differences and the ageing effect are not, we recommend that comparative ageing-rate claims be supported by seed-level score fusion, independent replication, and an alternative outcome-model specification.
This paper investigates developing real-world perception for active agents, proposes Gibson Environment for this purpose, and showcases a set of perceptual tasks learned therein.
F. Xia, Amir Zamir, Zhi-Yang He et al.· 2018 IEEE/CVF Conference on...· 1,069 citations· ⚡112
GAOKAO-Bench is introduced, an intuitive benchmark that employs questions from the Chinese GAOKAO examination as test samples, including both subjective and objective questions that contribute a robust evaluation benchmark for future large language models and offers valuable insights into the advantages and limitations...
Xiaotian Zhang, Chun-yan Li, Yi Zong et al.· arXiv.org· 216 citations· ⚡17
An algorithm is proposed which leverages disentangled semantic factors to generate adversarial perturbation by altering controlled semantic attributes to fool the learner towards various "adversarial" targets.
Haonan Qiu, Chaowei Xiao, Lei Yang et al.· arXiv.org· 208 citations· ⚡17
This work proposes a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, and suggests that the best loss depends on the inductive biases most appropriate for a given setting, an oft-overlooked consideration.
This work investigates the possibilities of using LLMs in a resume screening setting via a document retrieval framework that simulates job candidate selection and finds that the MTEs are biased, significantly favoring White-associated names in 85% of cases and female-associated names in only 11.1% of cases.
This work shows that orders of magnitude enhancement in performance could be obtained by a combination of hardware improvements and tight quantum-HPC integration and introduces high-performance architectures for quantum-probabilistic computing with custom-designed accelerators to tackle today's industry-scale classical...
Masoud Mohseni, Artur Scherer, K. Johnson et al.· arXiv.org· 121 citations· ⚡9
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.