Skip to content

Verification as an Architectural Layer for LLM Agents: A V-Model Design, and a Pilot Study of Its Deterministic Core

Sep 2026 · 0 citations · 48 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

A pilot implementing the acceptance- and unit-level verifier pairs is reported, comparing five configurations that share one executor, tool set, and scorer and differ only in verification, on the four-hop stratum of MuSiQue with an 8B-parameter backbone.

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) agents built on the ReAct pattern concentrate four responsibilities in one model: selecting a strategy, choosing each action, formatting it, and judging whether the result is adequate. Nothing outside the generative loop can reject its output, so an agent that cannot make progress does not report failure; it runs until an external budget stops it. We propose treating verification as an architectural layer by adapting the V-model from software engineering: specification levels descend from requirements to individual steps, each level is paired with a dedicated verifier, a deterministic controller enforces every verdict, and only verification outcomes write to memory, so a rejection localizes the level that introduced the fault and an agent halts by declining rather than by exhaustion. Each verifier separates a zero-cost deterministic \emph{gate} from an optional LLM \emph{judge}, so the contribution and cost of each can be measured independently. We report a pilot implementing the acceptance- and unit-level verifier pairs, comparing five configurations that share one executor, tool set, and scorer and differ only in verification, on the four-hop stratum of MuSiQue with an 8B-parameter backbone. Across 47 executions, the two unverified configurations answered none of ten questions, every run ending at a step cap or provider token limit; the verified configuration without a planner answered eight and abstained on the rest. Deterministic gates produced eight of the nine observed corrections at zero marginal cost, and planning degraded performance once verification was present. These results characterize termination behavior, not accuracy at scale; we outline a twelve-month plan to complete and evaluate the full architecture, including the integration-level pair the pilot omits.

View source

Similar papers

Preprint Aug 2026

Rebuild Dossier: Mechanically-Enforced Specs for Agentic App Rebuilds, and What Model-Tier Failures Reveal

An AI agent's rebuild is only as good as the process that produced it. Prior work found that once a model is strong enough, a multi-agent rebuild pipeline loses to the simplest approach: giving the model the original code and one instruction (AgentModernize). We present rebuild-dossier, an open-source tool that locks a...

P. Fawcett · 0 citations
Book Open access Oct 2026

Formal Runtime Verification for Tool-Using LLM Agents: An Offline Same-Benchmark Study on AgentDojo and STAC

Guardrails for tool-using LLM agents are usually application-specific rules, which makes multi-step, data-dependent safety policies hard to specify, audit and reuse. As a declarative alternative, we evaluate metric first-order temporal logic (MFOTL), replaying the recorded trajectories that AgentDojo, STAC and R-Judge...

Nikolaos Kekatos, Stylianos Basagiannis, Marinelio Chintri et al. · 2 citations
#artificial intelligence Preprint Oct 2026

Multi-Aspect Runtime Verification for Simulation-Based V&V of LLM-Enabled Autonomous Agents

LLM-based agents are entering decision-support roles in defence staff work, where the obligations they must respect are already written down and binding, and where retraining is not available as a control because models arrive as procured components. What can be placed under engineering control is the interface between...

Nikolaos Kekatos, D. Nikou, Anastasios Temperekidis et al. · 0 citations
#artificial intelligence Review Oct 2026

The Harness as the Only Mutable Surface: Compliance-Bounded Self-Evolution of LLM Agents in Credit Pipelines, with a Measured Admission Gate

Self-improving LLM agents can adapt a credit pipeline to a changed rule, but an agent that rewrites itself destroys the artefact a supervisor reviews: a named change, a recorded test, an approval. We argue that self-evolution is reviewable only if it is confined to the runtime harness (instruction text, tool-call logic...

R. Akhtyamov · 0 citations

Related blog posts

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.