Programmable governance and institutional design in decentralized autonomous organizations: a comparative study of RARI DAO, Arbitrum DAO, and Optimism DAO

Abstract

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) represent one of the most consequential experiments in organizational design to emerge from blockchain technology. By encoding governance rules into smart contracts and recording every vote, proposal, and treasury decision immutably on-chain, DAOs offer globally distributed communities a high degree of transparency and accountability in collective decision-making. This study examines governance design and participatory innovation across three DAOs: RARI DAO, Arbitrum DAO, and Optimism DAO. Each has taken a distinct structural approach to the problem of collective decision-making at scale. Using a qualitative comparative case study method, the research draws on governance forum discussions, proposal records, and official documentation, analyzed through thematic coding and cross-case comparison. The theoretical frame draws primarily from Ostrom’s (1990) commons governance principles, with Scott’s (1995, 2014) institutional theory and Donaldson’s (2001) contingency theory applied as supplementary analytical lenses. Across all three cases, the findings indicate the emergence of increasingly formalized governance architectures designed to balance decentralization, coordination efficiency, and operational security. Communities building governance infrastructure from scratch, iterating rapidly in response to community feedback, and developing structural solutions: delegate incentive programs, participation incentive mechanisms, bicameral legitimacy systems, constitutional frameworks, and dedicated legal entities that represent an emerging configuration of governance mechanisms. Two cross-case findings are particularly notable. First, all three DAOs independently converged on a three-body governance architecture comprising a legal foundation, a security council, and token-holder governance — suggesting that similar governance problems, encountered in similar technical and legal environments, tend to produce similar structural solutions. Second, while these architectures are structurally similar, they differ significantly in how governance processes are implemented in practice, reflecting differences in scale, formalization, and community context. These findings contribute to the literature by providing a structured cross-case analysis of DAO governance design and offering practical insights into programmable institutional design and blockchain-enabled coordination systems.