TL;DR
This note isolates a formal core of the Mind-Body Problem, model it in the language of computability theory, and shows that under this formalization, the associated decision problem is (Turing) algorithmically unsolvable.
In our book Why machines will never rule the world [13, 14] we argue that arti- ficial general intelligence is mathematically impossible. This is because the human beings and the processes which exhibit intelligence are complex systems whose be- haviour cannot be captured by the kinds of models that we can generate wit...
It is claimed that the contrast between AI and the classical theism outlook is highly relevant for the cluster of issues relating to transparency or opacity, reliabilism, and trust, which is discussed today as the black-box problem.
A unified vision is offered: intelligence arises from constrained architectures and emergent patterns, and as AI systems become more autonomous, they may require surrogate forms of consciousness to handle complex, real-world challenges—though these will never fully replicate the biological original.
Abstract Can physical reality be fully captured by an algorithmic Theory of Everything? We argue not. Gödelian incompleteness shows that no sound, recursively axiomatizable formalism proves all truths of a sufficiently rich domain, while Tarskian undefinability shows that no such formalism defines its own truth predica...
Moderate inferentialists defend the thesis that inferences determine the truth-conditional meanings of the logical operators. An important technical and philosophical challenge to this position is the so-called categoricity problem. This is the problem that logics can be soundly interpreted by non-standard models which...
Anderson and Piccinini’s robust mapping account holds that genuine physical computation requires physical-computational equivalence (PCE), whereby the physical states realizing a computational state must carry exactly the same information about the system’s computational trajectory as that computational state. Though t...
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.
