Sep 2026· Mind & Language· Vol 41, pp. 531 - 540· 0 citations· 14 references
Abstract
Frances Egan argues for a deflationist view of intentionality, on which intentionality is merely part of a pragmatically motivated explanatory “gloss” on theories of mind and behavior. While sympathetic to the project, I worry that the view is inadvertently committed to genuine intentionality: For intentionality to be a mere pragmatically motivated gloss on our theories, theorists must accept theories with particular glosses and have other theory‐directed attitudes, which seem to be genuinely intentional. I suggest that we adopt a restricted deflationism, accepting some instances of intentionality but not others. This view preserves the spirit, though not the letter, of Egan's.
Philosophers introduce terms to express concepts in service of particular motivations. When a theorist argues that an existing term should express a different concept instead, this constitutes a terminological takeover. I argue that when a term has been stipulatively introduced, the original motivation constrains wha...
There has been a recent surge of interest in normative internalism, according to which what you ought to do depends on your beliefs about morality. This view has potentially wide-reaching implications for practical action, policy choice, and societal norms. The view is motivated by certain compelling examples, but in...
Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnatura...
Lucia Schwarz· Journal of Moral Philosophy· 0 citations
Some interpreters hold that, for Aristotle, the pleasant is the primary
de dicto
goal of every vicious person. I argue that this is false and develop an alternative account of vicious motivation by self-interest (
to sumpheron
). In
Nicomachean Ethics
2.3, Aristotle claims that the vicious person errs with re...
Descartes'
cogito
argument is perhaps the most well‐known philosophical argument, the conclusion of which is supposed to be a form of rationalism that allows for contingent
a priori
knowledge of the world. In this short note, I argue that, in fact, the all important statement, ‘I am, I exist’, should be analyse...
Frances Egan's Deflating mental representation gives a forceful defence of deflationism about mental representation. Deflationism is a form of selective realism: It is realist about vehicles of mental representation, but not contents. In this commentary, I will argue that deflationism is unstable. Ultimately, despite i...
Adam Toon· Mind & Language· 0 citations
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