Some interpreters hold that, for Aristotle, the pleasant is the primary
de dicto
goal of every vicious person. I argue that this is false and develop an alternative account of vicious motivation by self-interest (
to sumpheron
). In
Nicomachean Ethics
2.3, Aristotle claims that the vicious person errs with respect to the objects of choice: the pleasant, the
sumpheron
, and the fine. I argue that the vicious person can commit conceptual errors, ordering errors, and errors of omission in her pursuit of these objects. I develop this reading by providing an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the
sumpheron
on which it is both a means and an end.
In this paper, we translate and interpret the passage from Nicomachean Ethics 7.1146a21-32, in which Aristotle presents a sophistical paradox when discussing the difficulties surrounding the theme of akrasia. We base our analysis on the description of paradoxes in On Sophistical Refutations and on the explanation of th...
This article studies the division of falsehood in Divisiones Aristoteleae [31], which is preserved in three redactions: Recensio Marciana, Recensio Florentina, and Recensio Leidensis. I first examine the Recensio Marciana and argue that [31] aims to disassociate the falsehood of a πρᾶγμα from the falsehood of a λόγος b...
Aristotle’s notion of the fine death (
καλὸς θάνατος
) confronts us with a serious difficulty: to what extent is a fine death, which involves dying courageously on the battlefield, consistent with his theory of
εὐδαιμονία
? This article responds to the challenge by bringing in two parts of Aristotle’s ethics. I...
Frances Egan argues for a deflationist view of intentionality, on which intentionality is merely part of a pragmatically motivated explanatory “gloss” on theories of mind and behavior. While sympathetic to the project, I worry that the view is inadvertently committed to genuine intentionality: For intentionality to be...
Angela Mendelovici· Mind & Language· 0 citations
Abstract In the concluding chapter of Die Philosophie des Als Ob, Vaihinger offers an interpretation of Nietzsche’s epistemology in terms of his own fictionalism. Here, I suggest that Vaihinger’s interpretation is close to being correct, and that we still have much to learn from it. In particular, his reading promises...
In this paper, we critically examine the essay by Shiffrin, Stigler, and Keil (2026) on scientific understanding. We argue that, despite its uncontroversial moral message, the paper largely fails to articulate a compelling thesis. The central notion of an “illusion of understanding” is left insufficiently specified and...
David Kellen, M. S. Spektor· Computational Brain & Behavi...· 0 citations
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