A policy algebra is proposed that defines the reliability envelope within which agent capability may be exercised and provides researchers and practitioners with formal correctness conditions, executable decision semantics, and trace evidence for building agents that are not only capable, but reliably capable.
Abstract
Large language model-based agentic frameworks primarily optimize capability: whether an agent can reason, retrieve information, call tools, delegate work, and complete a goal. Enterprise execution requires a stronger property. A successful result is not reliable if it was produced through unauthorized data access, widened delegated authority, unapproved side effects, unrecoverable budget consumption, or incomplete evidence. This paper defines reliable capability as a path property: an agent is reliably capable only when it completes a task through action events that remain admissible under identity, profile, tool, data, memory, budget, artifact, approval, and audit constraints. We propose a policy algebra that defines the reliability envelope within which agent capability may be exercised. Security profiles and runtime obligations compose through joins, intersections, budget narrowing, approval inheritance, and evidence accumulation; the resulting composition is both trust-preserving and the least restrictive state satisfying all governing inputs. The algebra also propagates restrictions across multi-agent calls and introduces cost-aware artifact materialization, which redirects open-ended execution toward a recoverable outcome as budget exposure grows. The evaluation is interpreted as a reliability-capability trade-off rather than a capability benchmark: the policy-algebra runtime intervenes on 94.8% of policy-violating events while retaining an 86.9% task-completion rate, eliminates the observed profile-monotonicity and zero-artifact-exhaustion violations, and increases audit completeness to 98.6%. The method provides researchers and practitioners with formal correctness conditions, executable decision semantics, and trace evidence for building agents that are not only capable, but reliably capable.
The compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call, which proves Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations and proves Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC imple...
This work presents AID-Guard, a stateful authorization-to-effect closure protocol that revalidates the approved request and provider state at commit, retains one reservation under ambiguity, and permits release or one successor only after a terminal result or certified no effect with a delivery fence.
Agentic artificial intelligence expands the enterprise security boundary because autonomous agents can plan
tasks, retain memory, invoke tools, call APIs, and initiate business actions. Authentication at session start is therefore
insufficient when later actions may be influenced by untrusted content, poisoned memory,...
S. Suryawanshi· International Journal of Inn...· 0 citations
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