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Irreducible Causal Powers and Compatibilism

Aug 2026 · Analysis · 0 citations

Abstract

Many philosophers hold that free will consists in the exercise of an agent's irreducible causal powers. However, it is controversial whether a powers-based approach to free will is compatible with determinism or not. In two papers published in this journal, Mumford and Anjum (2014) and Conti (2025) offer opposite answers to this question: Mumford and Anjum argue that a powers-based theory of free will implies incompatibilism, whereas Conti argues that it implies compatibilism. In this article, I defend Mumford and Anjum's view against Conti's objections. My argument will be based on some crucial clarifications regarding the definition of determinism.

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