Sep 2026· Canadian Journal of Philosophy· pp. 1-11· 0 citations· 11 references
Abstract
The irreducibility thesis is the view that there are some reasons for action whose normative force is not explained by the value of the actions for which they are reasons, but which must instead be explained in terms of some relation between agents. This view has been developed influentially by Stephen Darwall, Margaret Gilbert, and R. Jay Wallace. In this article, I argue that the normative force of any reason must be explained by the value of the action for which it is a reason, and so that the irreducibility thesis is false.
What is it that is transmitted across known entailment from justified premises? My main aim in this paper is to clarify and defend the unpopular view that transmission of justification should be conceived as transmission of a justifier, and the search for cases in which transmission of justification fails should focu...
There has been a recent surge of interest in normative internalism, according to which what you ought to do depends on your beliefs about morality. This view has potentially wide-reaching implications for practical action, policy choice, and societal norms. The view is motivated by certain compelling examples, but in...
Many philosophers hold that free will consists in the exercise of an agent's irreducible causal powers. However, it is controversial whether a powers-based approach to free will is compatible with determinism or not. In two papers published in this journal, Mumford and Anjum (2014) and Conti (2025) offer opposite ans...
Although much ink has been spilled in discussing the relationship between rationality and normative reasons on the one hand and normative reasons and reasoning on the other, surprisingly little has been said about whether we can understand rationality in terms of reasoning. I propose a novel way to understand structu...
Hossein Ayati· Journal of the American Phil...· 0 citations
The purpose of this article is to explore a possible answer to the following question: In what sense can we say that instrumental reasoning is normative? Instrumental reasoning is understood here as a rational requirement, one that guides us in forming intentions toward the necessary means to ends that are already inte...
Matheus de Lima Rui· Filosofia Unisinos· 1 citation
Constructive alternativism, the philosophical position that the universe is always open to alternate interpretations, can be seen as consistent with current political rhetoric stating that conservative operatives are considering “alternative facts”. In this paper, I argue that such an interpretation of constructive alt...
L. Leitner· Personal Construct Theory &a...· 0 citations
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